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M ANY of the conflict problems which once existed in the bill of
lading field have now disappeared. Total extinction of such
problems is, however, not yet present, and complete uniformity of
interpretation of such instruments is not at this time foreseeable.
It becomes necessary then to investigate the present problems in this
field and in doing so an attempt will be made not only to list the
difficulties but also to extract certain of them for closer observation
both from an historical and a future base.
Perhaps it is best to begin with a study of one clause of a bill of
lading and carry that through in a more or less chronological process.
Only one is selected for a number of reasons: It is a clause which has
had more influence on the move toward uniformity than any other;
it is one which has continuing importance today; and, finally, it is
one which is also at the seat of most of the case law arising presently.
The clause chosen is the one by which the carrier attempts to exempt
himself from any liability arising from damage to cargo caused by
his or his agents' negligence.
In the early days of maritime carriage the common carrier was
made absolutely responsible for the safe handling of the cargo. Ab-
solute is not really a correct term as certain exceptions were allowed;
for example, he was not responsible for loss caused by an Act of God,
restraint of princes, public enemies, inherent vice, and that type of
damage caused by the cargo owner himself. Certain other contrac-
tual exceptions were early imposed by the draftsmen of bills of lad-
ing.' The culminating point was reached when these drafstmen went
so far as to include a clause exempting the carrier from liability for
damage to cargo when such damage was caused by the carrier's
own negligence. As Gilmore and Black state, "[T]he position of the
carrier became, roughly speaking, the reverse of the one he had oc-
cupied under the general maritime law. Instead of being absolutely
liable, irrespective of negligence, he enjoyed an exemption from li-
t This Article is the second of a two-part series. The first Article is presented in 15
Sw. L.J. 1 (1961).
* LL.B., Dalhousie University; LL.M., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University
of Michigan; Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'For a short discussion, see Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 120-21 (1957).
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ability, regardless of negligence, as wide as his bargaining position
enabled him to contract for."'
The carrier received the fullest support from the English courts
in that they uniformly upheld the validity of the negligence clause.
The Federal courts in the United States' struck down such clauses,
usually on the basis of public policy.
It is the contention of the writer that while it is certainly true
that conflict problems have been materially reduced by the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act' (Cogsa) in the United States and similar acts
and treaties in other maritime nations, there is still a large segment
of the conflict field which has not been touched at all. This area is
formed by three separate but inter-related pieces. In each of these
three it is contended that uniformity has had little or no effect and
that there is left for aid only the "ordinary" conflict of law rules of
the various jurisdictions involved. It is hoped that after the three
areas are listed and a study made of the choice of law rules available,
a method will suggest itself for a voluntary movement toward uni-
formity of rules in these three areas, if not to some form of uniform
convention or legislation.
First, while it is true that many of the maritime nations of the
world have either ratified the Brussels Convention or at least enacted
legislation similar to it (and in some cases, for example the United
States and England, both have been done) 6 some countries have not
done anything concrete toward making uniform maritime law as it
pertains to bills of lading. These countries are fairly well scattered
around the globe, but a large bloc appears in Latin America where
twenty Republics have not as yet made a move.7 Thus, we have the
first category of conflict of law problems which are still present. As
some nations have the uniformity which is desirable and others have
not, this is one place where conflict seeds can take root. If there is a
shipment from France to Argentina, interpretation as to validity of a
negligence clause in a bill of lading covering such shipment will
probably vary a great deal depending on a number of factors, not
2Id. at 121-22.
'See, e.g., Blackburn v. Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nay. Co., (1902) 1
K.B. 290; The Cressington, (1891) P. 152.
4Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889). It
should be noted in passing that some state courts, notably in New York, were not so
strongly moved on policy bases, and allowed such exonerative clauses. See Rubens v.
Ludgate Hill S.S. Co., 65 Hun 625, 20 N.Y. Supp. 481 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
'49 Stat. 1207-13 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-15 (1958).
'Thirty-three countries ratified the Brussels Convention; many of these subsequently
introduced its principles into domestic legislation. A complete conspectus appears in Knauth,
Ocean Bills of Lading 453-95 (1953).




the least of which is the different effects such a clause has in these
two countries.
But this is only one facet of this first category and there are three
parts or subdivisions in all. The second comes from the fact that even
if all the remaining maritime nations of the world were to adopt the
Brussels Convention, conflicts would still be present for there are
differences in what many of the countries have adopted. That is,
none of the countries which have adopted the Convention has done
so verbatim. There are differences, mostly minor, a few of major
importance, among the so-called uniform nations.8 One of the gravest
problems stems from the fact that while the Brussels Convention it-
self provides that its provisions are to apply to all outward shipments
only,9 and most of the countries ratifying the Convention have gen-
erally gone along with this pattern, three of the countries involved
(in their enacting legislation it is true, but it is just as dangerous
there) have provided that the rules are to apply not only to outward
shipments, but to all inward shipments as well. The United States is
one of these three," and many problems in the conflict of law field are
formed by this provision. When a shipment is inbound to the United
States from England and the forum which has to determine the va-
lidity of a negligence clause sits in some third country, e.g., Chile,
then the question becomes very difficult. The reverse situation, ship-
ment inbound to England from the United States, same forum, pre-
sents equally disturbing problems, since British legislation applies
only to outward shipments. More will be seen of this later, however.
The third subdivision of this first category comes from the fact that
while some countries have ratified the Brussels Convention (and some
of these have enacting legislation as well) a few countries" have only
the legislation. When this is combined with the provision in French
law, e.g., that their rules will apply to all shipments originating in
France as well as to shipments inbound to France from a country
which is a signatory to the Convention (which Canada, e.g., is not)
then, while Canada has the rules in legislative form, as far as France
is concerned "ordinary" conflict rules will probably decide the valid-
'For example, the limit of liability provisions differ. Great Britain's is £ 100, while
the United States' is $500.00. For other figures and interesting comment that because of
the $500.00 figure in the United States, all cases that can possibly be sued upon in the
United States are done so, see Knauth, Renvoi and Other Conflicts in Transportation Law,
49 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1949). The £ 100 figure was raised in 1950 to £ 200 by the
British Maritime Law Association Agreement. See Hardy-Ivany, Bills of Lading, Current
Legal Problems 1959, 209, 213.
Article 10, Brussels Convention, provides that it is to apply to "bills of lading issued
in any of the contracting states."
"0The other two are the Philippines and Belgium.
" Canada, for example. See Water Carriage of Goods Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 291 (1952).
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ity, in a French forum, of this negligence clause in a bill of lading
issued in Canada."
In summary of this first category, it may be appreciated that al-
though uniformity in interpretation of clauses in ocean bills of lading
has been largely achieved, large gaps still exist which conflict of law
rules are going to have to fill, at least until complete uniformity is
advanced by way of universal, identical adoption of a convention
such as the Brussels Convention by all maritime nations. Such adop-
tion must likewise be in the same fashion in all adopting countries,
i.e., ratification by all, legislation by all, or both by all. Such agree-
ment is understandably hard to come by."
The second area from which conflict problems may arise today is
from an expected source, viz., the validity of a negligence clause as
it pertains to deck cargo, live animals, and cargo carried under a
charterparty as contrasted with a bill of lading. The charterparty
area will not be discussed in detail in this Article and it is merely
mentioned here as a source of conflict problems.
Section 1301 (c) of Cogsa makes it very clear that deck cargo is
not subject to this legislation. The Brussels Convention is followed
exactly in this respect. 4 If the Convention does not touch deck cargo,
then it is obvious that the conflict of law problems are still possible
as much as they ever were in this area."
In the case of live animals, an area which has always received
special attention due mainly to the problems inherent in transporta-
tion, once again Cogsa does not apply." Those meeting at the Brussels
Convention had not seen fit to include live animals due mainly to
the difficulty in legislating uniformly for problems which could differ
so radically in various parts of the world. 7 Hence the parties are free
" This will be covered later in this work, but references may now be had to Knauth,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 160.
"See chart, Appendix, infra p. 268.
14 Section 1 (c).
" In the United States, as Cogsa does not apply to deck cargo, then the law as it
existed prior to 1936 evidently does apply. Prior to 1936, the law applicable in this coun-
try to bills of lading was the Harter Act and it did cover deck cargo. However, by section
1311 of Cogsa, 49 Stat. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. S 1311 (1958) (section 12, Brussels
Convention) the Harter Act is expressly preserved but only for that period of time "prior
to the time when the goods are loaded on or after the time they are discharged from the
ship." Such being the case, deck cargo is still under the influence of the Harter Act but
only during the period of time which can be described as before and after "tackle to
tackle." During the voyage, then, the Harter Act does not apply to deck cargo and we saw
above that Cogsa does not apply. It appears, therefore, that in the United States at least
this is an area open to contractual freedom between the shipper and the carrier. It is of
course possible for the parties to stipulate for Cogsa application to this type of cargo
during the voyage and, according to Knauth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 236, this is the
practice.
'649 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (c) (1958).
" Knauth, op. cit, supra note 6, at 237.
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to contract between themselves as to what terms the carriage of ani-
mals will be subjected. The clause against liability for negligence is
one of the "tools" which a carrier can use in his contractual bidding."
The important thing for this work is that this is simply another chink
in the uniform wall through which conflict problems can come.
Finally, in the second area, the United States Cogsa does not apply
to shipments between foreign ports; and legislation in other countries
has similar provisions. For example, if there is a shipment from
Argentina to England and the validity of a negligence clause in the
bill of lading covering that shipment is in question in a New York
court, Cogsa has no sway in such court on this matter and reference
will have to be made to conflict of law rules to decide its validity.
19
(Public policy also has its place here.) It is perhaps here that theo-
retically most of the cases can arise; this is particularly true if the
forum is in a country, like England, which has fewer restrictive ideas
on the favorability of such a clause.
The third area from which one may find conflict of law problems
arising is in the situation where there is a stipulation in the bill of
lading for governing law and the court of the forum is willing to
accept this agreed upon law. To illustrate: If there is a shipment from
one country to another and both have adopted the Brussels Conven-
tion, then it would appear that no choice of law problem is present.
However, when there is added to this the stipulation that all questions
arising on this bill are to be interpreted according to the law in the
place of shipment or perhaps in a third country, difficulties begin to
arise. In the latter case, should the forum, supposing it to be in the
country of destination of the shipment, allow such freedom of con-
tracting to prevail? If it does allow such autonomy, then it is evident
that a choice of law rule is born. The court of the forum now can
apply the lex loci destinationis, lex loci contractus, or the law of state
X, the third selected jurisdiction. Even if the selection is confined to
"Live animals . .. are received and carried at shipper's risk of accident or mortality,
and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage thereto arising or resulting from
any matters mentioned in . . . Carriage of Goods by Sea Act . Carver, Carriage of
Goods by Sea 158 (1952).
'
9See Robinson, Admiralty 548 (1939). It should be noted, however, that it is possible
to have an application of Cogsa in a completely foreign fact situation where there has
been an incorporation of the statute into the bill of lading. Such was the case in The
Edmund Fanning, 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 86 (2d Cir.), where a bill of lading covering a
shipment from Germany to Korea contained as one of its terms the United States Cogsa.
The district court held that according to the express words of the statute ("carriage of
goods by sea to or from ports of the United States") it "does not apply to the shipment
in suit . . . because . . . not shipped to or from a United States port . . ." 1952 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1147, 1168 (S.D. N.Y.). On appeal, the court found that there was no public policy




one of the two primarily involved states-place of shipment or place
of destination-and the forum is in one and the forum selected by
the parties in the bill is in the other, there are still problems. If the
forum declines to hear the case and adverts to the choice of parties,
then a conflict problem has arisen because even if the two states have
adopted the provisions of the Brussels Convention, as it was pointed
out earlier, the adopted provisions may differ in some details.
The obvious answer to this possible problem is to disallow any
stipulation which selects a forum and a governing law. The merit of
such a suggestion deserves separate consideration and this will be
attempted later. It should be noted here that a grave danger can
exist in allowing such a stipulation in at least one instance. A recent
case is illustrative of this point."
A shipment of cocoa beans was consigned to a party in Philadelphia
on board a Swedish freighter, the shipment originating in Sweden.
The vessel was lost at sea and the consignee filed a bill in New York
for the loss. A clause in the bill of lading (which had been issued in
Sweden) read as follows: "Any claim against the carrier arising under
this bill of lading shall be decided according to Swedish law . . . and
in the Swedish courts, to the jurisdiction of which the carrier sub-
mits himself." To this stipulation the district court gave effect and
declined to take jurisdiction of the case. The court of appeals agreed
with the lower court "that the jurisdictional agreement was not un-
reasonable and that the adherence of the parties to that agreement...
should be given effect.
21
The criticism of the decision in the case stems largely from an
interpretative view of Cogsa, and in particular to section 3 (8)
thereof. By this section, any "lessening [of] such liability otherwise
than as provided in this Act, shall be null and void and of no effect."
It was contended that referral of the case to Sweden would possibly
lessen the liability of the carrier. Of even more force is the argument
that it is difficult to escape from the plain meaning and the clear
purpose of section 13 of Cogsa that "This Act shall apply to all con-
tracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United
States in foreign trade." (Emphasis added.) It is clear that under
the decision in the Muller case the application, which would appear
to be mandatory, of Cogsa, is set aside in favor of a law which the
20Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 1687, 1688 (2d Cir.).
It is interesting to note here that the Australian Sea-Carriage of Goods Act, 1924, § 9,
disallows any stipulation which would oust the jurisdiction of the Australian courts in a
case of shipment into or out of Australia. See, e.g., Wilson v. Compagnie des Messageries
Maritimes, (1954) 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 544.
2Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., supra note 20, at 1690.
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parties themselves have selected. It is true, as Gilmore and Black have
pointed out," that Sweden has enacted the Hague Rules, but these
differ in at least some respects from the American version as con-
tained in Cogsa and the possibility of a "lessening" of the carrier's
liability is a very real one.
From this case, which will be examined later in connection with
the more detailed study of autonomy, another example of the possi-
bilities which still exist for conflicts to arise is apparent. Before a
deeper investigation of the solution of these problems is attempted,
a brief collection of these "openings" will serve as a refresher.
It can now be said that conflict of law problems in the bills of lad-
ing field can arise from the following sources.
(1) Some countries do not have any uniform laws in relation to
bills of lading; any problem involving only those states will probably
have a conflict of law question closely entailed.
(2) If the matter involves two countries which have adopted the
provisions of the Brussels Convention, conflicts are still possible be-
cause of the differences in what has been adopted.
(3) Any matter involving a country from (1) and a country
from (2) is an area in which conflict of law problems can find root.
(4) If the forum is France or Sweden, then as to inbound ship-
ments from a country which has not ratified the Brussels Convention,
but has only the enacting legislation, France will apply her conflict
of law rules rather than her, or another's, version of the Brussels
Convention.
(5) Where the cargo consists of live animals, or is carried on the
deck, the uniformity of conventions is forsaken and conflicts rules
are still in operation.
(6) When a case arises in one country concerning a shipment be-
tween two other countries, the Brussels Convention and its enact-
ments in the various countries have no effect and conflict of law
rules must supplant.
(7) In that area where autonomy is evidenced by stipulation in
the bill of lading for forum or law, the possibility has at least been
evidenced of conflict rules coming into action.
II. CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS
As it is evident that conflict of law rules are going to play a fairly
important role in maritime shipments, it becomes necessary now to
seek out the possible choices which have been made in the past and
"'Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 1, at 125 n.23.
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will presumably be available in the future. It will be well to remem-
ber here that we are discussing the validity in varying fora of the
negligence clause as it appears in bills of lading. In order to com-
pletely exhaust this subject, it is necessary to study the possible
choice of law rules available to any court to determine the validity
of such clauses, in an attempt to illustrate the array and to show the
unification which is possible and necessary.
A. Lex Loci Contractus
There is no doubt that the lex loci contractus has received wide
recognition as a choice of law rule to govern validity of contracts.
Many courts and many writers have selected this as the applicable
law in contractual cases; . it becomes necessary then to ascertain how
valid a selection it is in bill of lading situations.
The Restatement of The Conflict of Laws makes no pretense to
adopt anything but the lex loci contractus rule in water carriage
cases. Section 338 thereof reads as follows: "The law of the place of
contracting determines the validity of a contract limiting the carrier's
liability."
Instances of application of this rule in railroad bill of lading
24cases are numerous but application to water carriage is another
matter.
Professor Beale takes a similar stand in his treatise that the law of
the place of contracting is the proper choice to make in order to de-
termine the validity of a contract of carriage.2 ' He cites, with his
2' Besides the Restatement and Professor Beale which are looked at later, it might be
mentioned that Professor Rabel appears in this instance, at first glance, to favor the place of
making rule: "[C]ontracts of carriers are ordinarily subjected to the law of the place where
the contract is made and the transport begins." Rabel, Conflict of Laws 452 (1947).
(It is interesting to note that at times some emphasis has been placed on this dualistic
treatment-place of making and place where shipment begins. An intensive coverage is
contained in Annot., 72 A.L.R. 255 (1931)). However, Rabel's rationale explains that
place of contracting even in these cases is not chosen solely for the reason that it is the
place of contracting. Rabel, op. cit. supra, at 460. In the most recent admiralty text,
Gilmore and Black state that "In actions against the carrier for negligent stowage or
care of the goods during transit, conflict of laws principles would lead to the law of the
jurisdiction in which the bill was issued." Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 1, at 113.
Not all writers are as adamant as Beale nor all judges as sure as Learned Hand about the
applicability of the lex loci contractus rule. We shall see some of the judicial opinions in
the text, infra; it should be noted here, however, that in the latest edition of Dicey the
editors make an important differentiation between contracts for the carriage of passengers
and contracts for the carriage of cargo. With reference to the latter, Dicey does say that
"the lex loci contractus is not, generally, as such the proper law of the contract." Dicey,
Conflict of Laws 830 (1958). Finally, Professor Leflar's text on conflicts, of recent origin
as well, disagrees quite vehemently with Professor Beale and the Restatement and states
succinctly its (the Restatement's) main difficulty in that "the Restatement's solution was
that most of the American states were already committed to positions inconsistent with it."
Leflar, Conflict of Laws 235 (1959).
" See, e.g., Sasinowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 74 F.2d 628, 631 (1st Cir. 1935).
"a2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1187 (1935).
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usual thoroughness, some thirty-seven cases" which he maintains
support his thoughts on the place of contracting rule. Of this number,
many are railroad cases which do not concern us here; a few likewise
must be disregarded as they are telegraph cases; the remainder, the
water carriage cases, make up a group of seven cases. Of this number
four ' are passenger liability suits which are not applicable here; the
remaining three now require attention.
In the first, The Miguel di Larrinaga," machinery was shipped from
Liverpool, England to Cuba. The bill of lading contained a negligence
clause and damage resulted from negligent action. The forum was
in the United States. The libelant, conceding that by the law of
England a negligence clause was valid, proposed that the law of
Cuba did not allow such clauses; as the law of Cuba was not known,
it should be presumed to be the same as that in the United States, as
the forum, and that the court should therefore hold the clause in-
valid. The court decided that such a presumption could not be made
by virtue of a decision of the United States Supreme Court2 although
Hough, J. did suggest that another presumption-that a contract
valid where made is valid everywhere-would override the presump-
tion of similarity of law proposed by the libelant. He then goes on
to say in regard to this latter presumption: "If there were no other
line of reasoning presented, I should hold that the presumption just
referred to overrode that relied upon by libelant."" The "other line
of reasoning" is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
the Cuba R.R. case." It is a little difficult to find in the latter decision
a categorical statement adopting the lex loci contractus rule. This is
enforced somewhat in the headnote, the first statement of which
reads: "A contract valid where made is valid everywhere, unless con-
trary to the public policy of the place of performance; . . . ,s' No-
where in the case is there any justification for such a statement; no
mention of public policy or place of performance is to be found. In
any event, such a statement, or at least the first few words of it-
which is all that Judge Hough does put forth-is, in the final analysis,
pure dictum. One may argue that this case stands for the rule that
21Id. at 1187 n.6.
"Secoulsky v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 223 Mass. 465, 112 N.E. 151 (1916);
O'Regan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 160 Mass. 356, 35 N.E. 1070 (1894); Fonseca v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 153 Mass. 553, 27 N.E. 665 (1891); Drozinski v. Hamburg-Am. Line, 193
Mo. App. 60, 181 S.W. 1164 (1916). The last-mentioned case should not really be included
in Professor Beale's list of cases which exemplify the lex loci contractus rule as it is an
application by the court of the law of the forum.
2 217 Fed. 678 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
"Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
0217 Fed. 678, 679 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
"Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
"The Miguel di Larrinaga, 217 Fed. 678 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
1961]
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the lex loci contractus is the correct choice of law rule to govern
validity of carriers' contracts, but it is believed that something more
substantial will have to be found to put the argument on a secure
basis.
The second case" concerns a shipment of goods from Italy to the
United States. The bill of lading contained a limitation of liability,
but not a negligence clause. The forum was in the United States. A
stipulation in the bill called for application of English law to settle
all disputes arising thereunder. Learned Hand, J. in his famous "boot-
strapping" analysis of the autonomous phrase quickly disposes of it.
We will have more to say on this later. 4 What is important here is
that Hand decides that the validity of the limitation of liability clause
is to be determined by the law of the place of contracting. There
is no doubt that this case stands for the proposition under which
Professor Beale quotes it, that the lex loci contractus is the correct
law to determine the validity of clauses in a bill of lading. There
is however one important phrase of Learned Hand's in the final para-
graph of the decision which has apparently been completely over-
looked and which might provide a bar to its use as a precedent in a
case which involved not a limitation of liability clause but a pure
negligence clause. The statement is this: "We might indeed have to
refuse to give effect to the clause ... if we disapproved the result too
much, but that question does not arise. The limitation, if made here,
would have been valid."
The question now becomes acute: would a negligence clause, in
Learned Hand's mind, be such as to give a result of which he would
disapprove too much? There is no doubt that it would, for, as he
says in the last few words of the quotation, the limitation of liability
would be valid if made in the United States, but most certainly the
negligence clause would not have been. 5 The result therefore is in-
escapable: if a negligence clause had been in question in the Gerli
case, it would not have been upheld simply because of a rule that it
was valid where made and that law must apply. Once again then it
may at least be supposed that this case is extremely limited in its scope,
and valueless as a precedent for upholding the validity of a negligence
clause in the United States because the clause was valid where the bill
was drawn.
The final of the three cases which are claimed to support the lex
loci contractus rule in water carriage cases contains one statement
" E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
34 See pp. 246-47 infra.




which, it is thought, destroys any significance that might at first be
attached to it as a place of contracting instance: "The rule upon the
subject is well settled, and has been often recognized by this court,
that contracts are to be construed according to the laws of the state
where made, unless it is presumed from their tenor, that they were
entered into with a view to the laws of some other state.""
It is true that the court found here that the parties did not intend
the application of any other law but the place of shipment. It should
be added, however, that it is difficult to conceive just how a weighing
was accomplished in this case in line with the court's above-quoted
introduction; and second, one must still ask: how valuable is the de-
cision in this case as a precedent for a future lex loci contractus ruling
when one considers the rule of the court, unvarnished as it is, and
then considers the decision, based as it is on facts. The rule is a
multi-purpose one; it should not be narrowed to a single-purpose one.
Perhaps the above discussion may be described as somewhat pica-
yune, but it is hoped that the necessity and validity of this analysis
will be apparent in the ensuing pages. It should now be obvious that
what is being attempted is a destruction of the rule which adopts the
law of the place of contracting as the correct choice of law to govern
the validity of these negligence clauses. It is in fact the thesis of this
writer that the choice is not a valid one and is one that has never, in
water carriage of goods cases, received any real support from the
judiciary. To substantiate this claim one need only read carefully
the following cases proposed as embodying the selection; there are
many and necessarily only a few can be discussed. It is hoped, how-
ever, that those selected are representative.
It seems rather odd that in nearly all of the cases mentioned in the
following accumulation, preference is first expressed for the law of
the place of making but the case is then decided on some other
ground. Almost without exception, lip-service is paid to the lex loci
contractus rule but it is not followed in the decision. The following
examples will more fully portray this picture.
The first group of cases has been loosely termed a "public policy"
group and a quotation from an article by R. H. Graveson will
evidence the reason for this: "On the vital question of the law
applicable to exemption clauses American courts, both before and
since this legislation [Cogsa], have decided quite simply on grounds
of public policy, ...""
6Hale v. New Jersey Steam Nay. Co., 15 Conn. 539 (1843).
37 Graveson, Bills of Lading and the Unification of Maritime Law in the English Courts,
The Conflict of Laws and International Contracts (Summer Institute-1949, University of
Michigan Law School) 65 (1951).
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It will be seen that this is not a completely valid statement, for
not all cases of this type are decided in American courts on the
grounds of public policy; the remark is, however, pertinent for it
leads into one group of cases which has as the basis for decision, public
policy.
Probably the leading decision is Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac.
Ry. s The defendant carrier contracted by bill of lading to carry a
cargo of silk from Shanghai to New York via ship to Vancouver and
rail from there to its destination. All carriage was done by vehicles
of the defendant. Upon arrival in Vancouver, some of the silk was
missing, presumably lost on the sea-voyage. Suit was brought in
New York for conversion. The defendant relied on the presence in
the bill of lading of the negligence clause. There was, as well, a
stipulation in the bill for the application of English law.
The New York Court of Appeals begins its decision by the familiar
ritual of saying that "the validity of a contract is determined by the
law of the jurisdiction where made, . . .""' There follows a painstak-
ing search for New York public policy to enable the court to avoid
this rule. The search succeeds and the court holds that the public
policy of New York is opposed to the negligence clause. Accordingly,
enforcement is prohibited in New York. There are a few remarks one
could make about this case, e.g., why would New York public policy
be endangered in an instance where a negligence clause affects only
a water shipment on the high seas some four thousand miles from
New York,"9 particularly when the court admits that the Harter
Act cannot apply to this case as it is a shipment between two foreign
ports-Shanghai and Vancouver. 1
The second case is of almost equal importance and is more authorita-
tive because it is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States." Here a shipment from Antwerp to New York was damaged
due to the negligence of the carrier; and, after being sued in the
United States, the latter relied upon a negligence clause. Once again
the Court agreed that "as a general rule, . . . the lex loci gov-
85254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930), noted, 16 Cornell L.Q. 380 (1930).
3 Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., supra note 38, at 414.
"0 The explanation that the shipment ended in New York is a little difficult to grasp
as a support for an application of public policy to a matter that occurred so far from
New York's boundaries.
41 This was the reason given for the decision disallowing the negligence clause in the
lower court. 1930 Am. Mar. Cas. 18. If the Harter Act does not apply-which, assuredly,
it does not-and as it is frequently referred to as expositive of the public policy of the
United States in admiralty matters, how can public policy be involved here? It would be
interesting to switch railroads in this case and have the CNR carry this silk after receiving
it from the CPR vessel, the loss still occurring on the high seas and the suit in the New
York forum.
4 The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263 (1901).
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erns, . . ."", but then, after indicating that intention of the parties
might be important as well, the Court remarked that "both these
elementary principles are subordinate to and qualified by the doctrine
that neither by comity nor by the will of contracting parties can
the public policy of a country be set at naught.""
Similarly, one might mention cases like The Guildhall," The
Glenmavis," Lewisohn v. National S.S. Co.,4 and The Trinacria,
4 8
among many others, that refer first to the lex loci contractus rule and
then decide the case, invalidating the negligence clause, on grounds of
public policy. This category, it will be remembered, is simply one of
many in which the courts, while mentioning the primacy of the
rule of the law of the place of making, have based their decisions on
some other choice. It is not here attempted to prove that the lex
loci contractus choice may not be made, but rather that it has not
been made; if this leads one to believe that such a choice will not
be made in the future, then the thesis of the writer will be borne
out.
The majority of water carriage contract cases which turn on choice
of law questions reduce themselves to a question of intention; that
is, the courts will usually choose as the applicable law that which
the parties have intended. This is done by the courts either by saying
that the place of contracting is the correct choice as this is the law
the parties intend (quite a different thing from starting at the other
end by choosing the lex loci contractus because it is the correct choice
of law rule, standing alone); by choosing the law of the place of
performance for the same reason, viz., intent; the law of the flag;
or, by selecting a law which has no connection whatever with the
contract.
Perhaps the best known case dealing with intent in this section is
Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co." Although
the decision would be the same today (but for vastly different reasons
due to the enactment of the Harter Act) ; nevertheless, the principle
as a conflict of law rule has not changed. Here, the Supreme Court of
the United States once again referred first to the lex loci contractus
as being the place of first resort. And they decided the case on an
application of the lex loci contractus. What the Court said, how-
ever, is what is important, for they did not simply say that the law
43Id. at 269.
"The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 269 (1901).
45 58 Fed. 796 (S.D. N.Y. 1893).
46 69 Fed. 472 (E.D. Pa. 1895).
47 56 Fed. 602 (E.D. N.Y. 1893).
4"42 Fed. 863 (S.D. N.Y. 1890).
49 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
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of the place of making-the United States-controls. The Court also
said that the general rule is that a contract is to be governed by
the law of the place where it is made unless the parties at the time of
making have a different intention." It would be thoughtless in the
light of the addition of the intent factor to assume anything except
that this case is decided on one ground: the parties intended at the
time of making the contract to be governed by the law at the place
where they entered into it, and this intention controls." If such was
not the case, why does the Supreme Court even consider intention?
Why not simply apply the general rule (place of making) and be
done with it?
Again, if the case stood alone, one could possibly be persuaded
that the lex loci contractus rule is applied without more. The problem
is that there are many other cases in which the courts have picked
the law of the place of making the contract as the applicable law
on the theory that this is what the parties had intended, and not
because it was the place where the contract was made. Reference to
any or all of the cases in the following footnote will reveal this to
be true.
Occasionally, too, the court will choose as the applicable law that
of the place of performance. Some space will be taken with this
choice as a separate topic a little later," but it should be mentioned
here that it sometimes happens that the court will again preface its
solution by rendering lip service to the lex loci contractus choice
and go on to say that if the parties intend differently, then the court
will pay heed to this and in so doing choose the law of the place of
performance as the corect law. For example, in the early English case
of Robinson v. Bland " in which Lord Mansfield initiated this theory,
at least for England, he stated that the lex loci contractus can never
be the governing law if the parties had an express view to the law of
another country-here the place of performance. In The Brant-
ford City," with a shipment from Boston to England, the court
50 Id. at 458.
"Professor Beale would appear to argue that this is the true ground upon which the
case was decided. 2 Beale, op. cit. supra note 25, at 1188 n.1.
'aThe Fri, 154 Fed. 333 (2d Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 210 U.S. 431 (1908); The
Henry B. Hyde, 90 Fed. 114 (9th Cir. 1898); The Hamildoc, 1950 Am. Mar. Cas. 1973
(Canada); The Niagara, 1944 Am. Mar. Cas. 1307 (Canada); The Skarp, 1932 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1301 (Canada).
53 See pp. 226-30 infra.
542 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1760).
529 Fed. 373 (S.D. N.Y. 1886).
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held along similar lines for the place of performance, using Story's
words" to bolster their position."
Finally, there have been some cases in which courts have expressed
initially the value of the lex loci contractus rule, and then resorted
to the overriding value of intent of the parties and have found this
intent to refer to some body of law which is neither place of making
nor place of performance. Often, reference has been made to a
place having no necessary connection whatsoever. Hence, in the
famous Vita Food case, 8 although counsel urged application of the
lex loci contractus,s the court found the contract to be governed by
English law because the parties had stipulated for such law. Accord-
ing to Lord Wright, who delivered the judgment, such expressed
intention is difficult to avoid."0 This case will be considered further
when the intention of the parties as a separate choice of law rule
is analyzed; it is mentioned here only as an instance of where the
urging of an application of the law of the place of making of the
contract is bypassed.
There are, then, a number of places one can select to escape from
the lex loci contractus rule. We have seen that the courts will some-
times resort to public policy and sometimes to intention. Often, as
well, there are applications of the law of the flag and the law of the
place of performance. 8' A brief look at each of these categories will
complete this section.
In a leading encyclopedia of English law, 2 one finds an indication
" "The presumed intent of the parties, however, is the basis of the common rule
making the law of the place of performance govern, instead of the law of the place of
execution of the contract (Story, Confl. Laws § 280;). ... The Brantford City, supra
note 55, at 387.
" The English companion case to Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix
Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889), is In re Missouri S.S. Co., (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321, where
the court found on the intention factor once again, but here instead of the place of making
having been intended by the parties as in the Liverpool Steam Co. case, they found an
intention on the part of the parties to be bound by the law of the place of performance.
Putting aside the charge some make of predilection for the application of English law on
the part of English courts, this case serves as an example of intention for the place of
performance which the courts have been able to find.
vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277 (P.C. N.S.).55 Id. at 281.
"°Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277, 290 (P.C. N.S.).
" Place of performance, that is, as a distinct choice of law rule and not place of per-
formance because that is what the parties intended. It should be mentioned here that this
section is concerned solely with one available choice of law rule-lex loci contractus-and
while more detailed treatment of the law of the place of performance, the law intended by
the parties, and the law of the flag as choice of law rules standing alone will be under-
taken in the following sections, they are here being brought forth as examples only of
those instances in which the court has before it the lex loci contractus problems and
chooses to disregard it for some other available choices.
2 1 Encyclopedia of the Laws of England 251-53 (1937).
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of another place in which the lex loci contractus is set aside. It is
there stated that:
In contracts of affreightment a different rule is followed from that in
ordinary commercial contracts on this point. In the latter, the general
rule is that the law of the place where the contract was made (lex loci
contractus) governs the contract, or, if the contract is made in one
country but is to be performed in another, the law of the place of per-
formance decides its effect. With regard to contracts of sea carriage, on
the other hand, if they contain nothing to show, either expressly or by
implication, what law they intend to adopt, the established rule is that
the law of the flag under which the ship sails determines the nature of
the shipowner's liability.
In the light of this statement, three representative cases are now
presented for observation; one is Canadian, one English, and the
last, American.
In the Canadian case,"3 shipment originated in the United States
to proceed to Canada on an American vessel. The forum was Canada.
The court decided that the contract was to be interpreted according
to the law of the United States. Mr. Justice Duff so decided because
that was the law of the flag." The remainder of the court reached
the same decision but it is difficult to ascertain if they did so because
it was the lex loci contractus, or because that is where the majority of
the performance was to take place. It makes no difference, however,
as all these places were in America. What is important in the decision
is that the court found the intention of the parties controlling and in
the absence of any other indications they must have intended to be
governed by the law of the flag, "and not, as in other contracts, by
the lex loci contractus."65
In Moore v. Harris," the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
decided that the contract covering a shipment of tea from England
to Canada was to be governed by the law of England as it was made
in England by the master of an English ship and the Council cited
as authority the leading English case on law of the flag, Lloyd v.
Guibert
In the final case, The Titania," shipment was made in England to
the United States and the forum was in the latter country. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York said this about
the controlling law: "The shipment being made in England, and on
63Richardson v. "Burlington", (1930) 4 D.L.R. 527.
64 Id. at 528.
"Richardson v. "Burlington", (1930) 4 D.L.R. 527.
" (1876) 1 A.C. 318 (P.C. Can.).
676 B. & S. 100, 122 Eng. Rep. 1134 (Q.B. 1865).
66 19 Fed. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1883).
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an English vessel, the law of the flag governs." Lloyd v. Guiberts'
was again given as a precedent; and thus one can assume that more
reliance may be placed on the latter half of the statement than on
the former, i.e., that the law of the flag is the governing law and the
place of shipment (which must be the place of making of the con-
tract) is of no moment.
From these three cases one can conclude that here also is an avenue
down which the courts can turn to escape the rigors of the lex loci
contractus doctrine. Once again, it bears repeating that this is another
instance in which the lex loci contractus rule was considered but not
followed. A look at the final facet-place of performance-and a
short summary is now in order.
The case of Louis-Dreyfuss v. Paterson S.S. Ltd.,' is in point for
this discussion. There, a shipment of grain was sent from a port in
the United States to a port in Canada for transhipment to another
Canadian port. After transhipment, the vessel was stranded in
Canadian waters with resulting damage to the cargo. The shipper
brought suit in the United States and the real issue in the case was
whether the court should apply Canadian or American law to de-
termine liability.
Mr. Justice Hand began with the statement that it is a well-settled
rule that the validity of a provision in a bill of lading which limits
the carrier's common-law duty is to be determined by the law of the
place where the contract was made. For this the learned Judge cited
Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co.,' and the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, section 338."7 He then con-
tinued by remarking that another well-settled rule provides that as
to matters of performance, the law of the place of performance
controls.
Now consider the problem of the place of a negligence clause in
such a judgment. In the Dreyfuss case there was no such clause in
the bill of lading, but this does not by any means make the case
valueless in a negligence clause set of facts. Consider one more state-
ment by Learned Hand in this case and then superimpose his state-
ments on a negligence clause case. The statement is this: "All we
need say here is that the same law which determines what liabilities
shall arise upon nonperformance, must determine any excuses for
696 B. & S. 100, 122 Eng. Rep. 1134 (Q.B. 1865),
7043 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930).
71 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
72 See p. 214 supra.
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nonperformance, which are no more than exceptions to those
liabilities."73
If we imagine for a moment the same fact situation as in the
Dreyfuss case but with a negligence clause in the bill of lading, what
effect would these three statements of Mr. Justice Hand's have? First,
if the announced rule that the lex loci contractus determines the
validity of a negligence clause were applied, the clause would be held
invalid; the contract being made in the United States, that law
would so decide. Second, applying the rule that the law of the place
of performance controls as to matters of performance, we must ask
if the negligence clause can be considered to fall within the per-
formance category. It is here that Judge Hand's third statement
comes into play, for one must deduce from it that as a negligence
clause is certainly an excuse for nonperformance, the law of the place
of performance must bring it into play and rule on its validity. One
writer disagrees with Judge Hand in this respect and claims that it
is a non sequitur to say that since the law of the place of performance
governs as to matters of performance, it must also determine what
excuses nonperformance." The present writer cannot agree with
this claim of a non sequitur and proposes instead that in this matter
at least Judge Hand is correct, i.e., the same law which determines
liability for nonperformance should as well determine any excuse
for nonperformance; the two concepts are too closely linked to
separate, and even as a practical matter separation would be un-
fortunate.
What picture does the superimposition of Judge Hand's state-
ments present? One hesitates to portray confusion but it is almost
inescapable that in the reasoning of the case an apparent dichotomy
is revealed. On the one hand, a rule is presented for a negligence
clause (which, of course, is dictum) that adopts the lex loci con-
tractus; on the other, a rule is presented for this case (which does
not have within its facts a negligence clause) that adopts the lex
loci solutionis. This, standing alone, is not too difficult; what is
obscure is just why, if there had been a negligence clause, Mr. Justice
Hand would have used the lex loci contractus, and since there was
not, why he used the law of the place of performance, because he
states very plainly that an excuse for nonperformance is to be sub-
jected to the law of the place of performance. Certainly a negligence
clause is nothing but an excuse for nonperformance.
One can only conclude that here it is doubtful if the lex loci
"3 Louis-Dreyfuss v. Paterson S.S. Ltd., 43 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1930).74 Note, 26 Il1. L. Rev, 441 (1931).
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contractus would have been the answer, if the Dreyfuss case had
had within its facts a negligence clause. One can not state categori-
cally that if there had been such a clause, Mr. Justice Hand would
have used the law of the place of performance to hold it valid; such
is too shaky a base on which to build. It is a case, however, which
disturbs somewhat the rigidity of the lex loci contractus rule in
some quarters, and perhaps it may serve as an indication of another
instance in which that choice of law rule is not truly the correct one.
This conclusion is emphasized when one considers a later case which
relied on the Dreyfuss case in its holding. In Bank of California v.
International Mercantile Marine Co.,75 a case concerning a shipment
of goods from the United States to Germany, the court decided that
a clause in a bill of lading relating to misdelivery (not a negligence
clause, but one analogous thereto) was a clause having to do with
nonperformance and hence was to be determined by the law of the
place of performance, Germany. The court relied exclusively on the
Dreyfuss case." It should also be noted, to align this case with the
topic under discussion (instances in which a bow is made to lex loci
contractus but a decision is based on lex loci solutionis), that the
court first mentioned that, "Questions of interpretation or initial
validity of the terms of the bill of lading are governed by the law
of the place where the bill of lading is issued, but questions relating
to the performance or breach and its effect are governed by the law
of the place of performance.""
In summary, it has been shown that while many references have
been made to the lex loci contractus as the controlling law in many
cases, in none has there been any actual adoption of such law on the
sole basis that that is where the contract was made. Such being the
case, might it not be posited that in water carriage cases where a bill
of lading having a negligence clause is up for study, some other
choice of law rule must be chosen if we are to reach the desired end,
i.e., a measure of uniformity in maritime commerce? A word should
be added with respect to the well-worn criticisms of the place of
making as a choice of law rule, e.g., that it is accidental at times and
at other times difficult to find. There are so many well-known
critiques that they need no elucidation and reference to words written
some eighty years ago by one of the finest Continental writers on
private international law, Savigny,"8 is sufficient.
7' 64 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 649 (1933).
76 Id. at 98.
7 Bank of California v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 64 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 649 (1933).
78 The section is too lengthy to quote here but reference to the following citation will
prove helpful. Savigny, Private International Law 198 (1869).
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It is frequently too easy to fall back on the set patterns of available
choice of law rules, although there is no doubt but that some of
these-lex loci contractus included-are valuable in some areas of
the law. In the field of admiralty law, however, where strides have
been made toward uniformity in such a large part, we should not be
lax and allow application because of facility; continuity and uni-
formity combined with rationality and logic are too important and
necessary to brush aside. In this connection, Professor Rabel's words
become even more apt as he remarks, "[W]e definitely have to
abandon the ancient scholastic tests, such as the law of the place
of contracting or the law of the place of performance." '
B. Lex Loci Solutionis
As Rabel has indicated that he feels the law of the place of per-
formance is not a satisfactory choice of law rule along with the law
of the place of making, this becomes a proper place in which to
investigate the former as a possible choice in cases where a negligence
clause is included in a bill of lading and its validity is being ques-
tioned. We ask then: What part has the lex loci solutionis played
and of what value will it be in our search for uniformity?
There can be no question here that the law of the place of per-
formance has been used many times to decide upon the validity and
interpretation of contracts generally."s One of the first proponents
of the place of performance rule was Story and his rule has already
been observed."' It should be noted that Story's rule is that first
resort is to be had to the place of making but if performance is to
be had in another place, the contract is to be governed by the law
of the place of performance. His rule is in some respects a sub-
sidiary one," but in its major aspect it is a fundamental rule. That
is, if a particular fact situation is presented-a contract is concluded
in X country to be performed in Y country-Story would then say
that the contract is to be governed by the law of the place of per-
formance. The really important words of Story, however, are
frequently omitted in statements of this familiar doctrine. These
words are contained within section 280 of his work and should be
here noted: "But where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to
be performed in any other place, there the general rule is, in con-
formity to the presumed intention of the parties . . ." then the law
of that place, as the place of performance, controls. (Emphasis
79 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 127, 130 (1947).
so Ibid.
81 See pp. 220-21 supra and note 56 supra.
82 Rabel, op. cit. supra note 79, at 463.
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added.) Then is it more important that the place of performance be
chosen as the governing law because it is a different place from that
where the contract was concluded, or that the place of performance
be chosen because that, presumably, is in accordance with the intent
of the parties? There should be no doubt of the overwhelming logic
in favor of the latter. If such is the case, and this is the contention
of this writer, then could we not say here (as we did in the preced-
ing discussion of the lex loci contractus rule) that while an applica-
tion of the lex loci solutionis may be made, what is really being used
by the courts is not a choice on geographical grounds, but a choice
based purely on intention? It is one thing to select the place of per-
formance because that is where the contract is to be performed; it
is another to select it as the place the parties intended. If we can
find then, in the actual decisions of the courts, that they are using
the lex loci solutionis from the intention base and not from a geo-
graphical base, we must agree with Rabel in his admonition to
abandon the scholastic tests of law of the place of contracting and
law of the place of performance.
Leaving aside the familiar arguments that the law of the place
of performance is imperfect in instances where there is more than
one place of performance, or where none is stated or even known at
the time the contract is concluded, 8 and concentrating on the pro-
posed thesis (that place of performance when it is chosen in mari-
time cases is chosen only because the parties have so intended) a few
representative cases will be discussed.
An intensive search has been made in the law reports of England,
Canada, and the United States and from this search one distinguishing
feature emerges: The number of cases which have been decided in
which the lex loci solutionis was used as a choice of applicable law in
water carriage of goods instances is exceedingly small. While there
are quite a few cases which have been decided using the law of the
place of performance," on the question of water carriage cases which
are restricted to cargo as distinguished from passenger cases, the
number becomes hardly worthy of note. In fact, only four cases
have been found which applied the law of the place of performance,
and only two of these were concerned with the validity of a negli-
gence clause.
In a classic case, In re Missouri S.S. Co.,'a shipment was made from
Massachusetts to England on a British vessel. The contract, made
83See Wolff, Private International Law 433 (2d ed. 1950).
842 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1086-174, 1188, 1267 (1935).
"' (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321.
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in Boston between an American and a British company, contained
the familiar negligence clause which was valid in England but invalid
in Massachusetts. The cargo having been lost by virtue of the negli-
gence of the carrier's agents, suit was brought in England and the
negligence clause entered the picture as the controlling factor. The
Court of Appeal decided that the law to be applied was English law
partly, it is true, because "England was the place to which the goods
were to be brought and the place at which the final completion of the
contract was to take place; ...,,s but mainly because this was one
of many factors which indicated an intention on the part of the
parties to be bound by English law. Thus, although one may say that
this case upholds the validity of the negligence clause on an applica-
tion of the lex loci solutionis, the true meaning of the case is that
a contract, as to its validity, is to be governed by that law which the
parties intend. No other interpretation is possible. It is true that
many English cases"7 have applied such reasoning to contract cases
and this is merely illustrative of the class: it does stand alone, how-
ever, in its unique position placed as it is alongside the Liverpool
case which we examined earlier.8 The writer has not found any case
however (and this is what the Missouri case illustrates so well by
illuminating the true judicial attitude in England) which applied
the lex loci solutionis simply because there was a place of perform-
ance different from the place of contracting; rather that law was
applied because such was intended by the parties. The prime con-
sideration then is intent and not place; subjective and not objective.
We will see that this is particularly apparent in English law, and
while intention has not had extensive application in the United States,
a place for it does exist as will be seen by a brief reference to the
three cases mentioned earlier.
Toward the end of the twentieth century, a shipment of cattle
was made from Baltimore to Liverpool, England and a stipulation
was contained in the bill of lading for English law8 and, once again,
a negligence clause was included. This time the forum was in the
United States, but the result was the same as in the Missouri de-
cision, viz., the law of England was chosen as the applicable law."
This time, however, we have a case much more illustrative of the
point to be made, i.e., here, the court quoted Story and his rule 280,
81 Id. at 431.
7E.g., Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, (1894) A.C. 202 (Scot.); The Njegas,
(1936) P. 90; Kremezi v. Ridway, (1949) 1 All E.R. 662 (K. B.).
88 See pp. 219-20 supra.
8" Which, if the forum had been in England, would no doubt have been decisive.
"
8 The Oranmore, 24 Fed. 922, 927 (D. Md. 1885).
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and used the following words from a Supreme Court case as a guide:
"The law of the place where the contract is made is to govern in
expounding and enforcing the contract, unless the parties have a
view to its being executed elsewhere, in which case it is to be gov-
erned according to the law where it is to be executed."" The case
was finally decided by choosing the applicable law based on the
intent of the parties."
The final two cases which must be considered are closely connected,
one following from the other. Both were mentioned earlier 3 in the dis-
cussion of the lex loci contractus rule and both have chosen the law
of the place of performance as the applicable law to govern excuses
for nonperformance. As the Bank of California case follows the
Louis-Dreyfuss case, it is thought that if the latter can be explainea,
the former will likewise occupy the same position.
It will be remembered that an apparent dichotomy was revealed
in Learned Hand's judgment in the Dreyfuss case where he, in
dictum, declared that if a negligence clause had been included in the
bill of lading, such would fall under the aegis of the lex loci con-
tractus, but as none was involved the lex loci solutionis was applied
since the case was concerned with an excuse for nonperformance.
Is it possible to find in Mr. Justice Hand's opinion any indication
that he selected the law of the place of performance on the basis
of some real or presumed intent of the parties, so that the thesis
of the present writer may be continued and reinforced? The answer
is no, and the Justice puts this to rest quickly, but he does admit
that selection of the lex loci solutionis by the parties has been made
in other cases. 4 While one may accept the dictum of Learned Hand
that a negligence clause will be controlled as to its validity by the
lex loci contractus, difficulty is encountered if it is conceded that a
negligence clause is an excuse for nonperformance, for Mr. Justice
Hand would, apparently, then say this is for the lex loci solutionis.
We are left then with a case which impedes the theory of intention,
"Ibid. Quoted from Cox v. United States, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 172, 203 (1832).
""It seems, however, quite generally conceded that the question is to be determined
by arriving at the intent of the parties to the contract, where that is possible." The
Oranmore, 24 Fed. 922, 927 (D. Md. 1885).
'Bank of California v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 64 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 649 (1933); Louis-Dreyfuss v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 43 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir. 1930).
'"Courts which have insisted that the parties must be found in some way to have
selected foreign law to control their rights, have so reasoned as to the law of the place
of performance. We think that the imputation of any such intent is a fiction . . . But
the parties cannot select the law which shall control, .. ." Louis-Dreyfuss v. Paterson S.S.,
Ltd., supra note 93, at 827. Cf. however a subsequent case which cites the Dreyfuss case
and then goes on to decide the case on intent. See Chinchilla v. Foreign Tankship Corp.,
1949 Am. Mar. Cas. 2104, 2108.
1961]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
but because of the difficulty presented by the reasoning in this
opinion, the fact that it is dictum, and the presence of the much
larger class of cases which have not seen fit to follow the reasoning
of the judgment," the case is not overly persuasive.
With the caveat of the Louis-Dreyfuss case in mind one can quickly
dispose of the law of the place of performance as a choice of law
rule available in these cases, for the lex loci solutionis is not a choice
which has proved popular in water carriage of goods cases. It bears
mentioning, as well, that in the minds of some writers, lex loci
solutionis is not a popular choice in any case." The present writer
cannot go quite that far, but in the very limited sphere under study-
water carriage of goods cases involving bills of lading-he is con-
vinced that no place exists for the law of the place of performance
as a choice of law rule to determine the validity of negligence clauses.
C. Law Of The Flag7
While the two choices already considered are general choice of
law rules open to any type of contractual agreement, the choice of
the law of the flag is, of course, peculiar to admiralty matters. It
would seem to follow that if any one choice of law rule is to pre-
dominate, this would be it. It has many apparent advantages, e.g.,
certainty and predictability, that the two previous choice of law
rules did not have; and, as for its acceptance as a choice of applic-
able law, while it has not received the widespread attention of lex
loci contractus or lex loci solutionis, it nevertheless puts in an ap-
pearance in a number of cases. However, the seemingly all-pervading
influence of the intention factor has made its presence felt, and the
task again is to determine whether the law of the flag can stand
alone, whether it can be objectively applied simply because it is the
law of the flag, or whether it has been and will be subjectively applied
because that is what the parties intended. A consideration of the
cases reveals the answer in no obscure fashion.
The leading English case is Lloyd v. Guibert" Although it is a
charterparty case, the principle remains the same where a bill of
lading is in issue, and accordingly the case provides an acceptable
" In a following section, dealing with cases in which the courts have applied that law
which the parties intended, appear many instances wherein the opportunity could have been
seized to favor the decision in the Louis-Dreyfuss case; aside from the Bank of California
v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 64 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
649 (1933), (which, remember, was not a negligence clause case, either) there is none.
"' See particularly, Morris, The Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded,
6 Vand. L. Rev. 505 (1952).
" For a discussion on the meaning of the term "law of the flag" see Dicey, Conflict of
Laws 322-23 (1958).
9' (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 115.
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introduction. A shipment was to be made on a French vessel from
Haiti to England. Damaged by high seas, the vessel was forced to put
into Fayal, a Portuguese port, and, in order to effectuate repairs, ttie
master borrowed money on a bottomry bond, executed on ship, cargo,
and freight. In England, after the vessel arrived, the ship and freight
could not bear the burden of the bond, and the cargo owned by the
plaintiff was called in. The plaintiff then claimed indemnification.
Under French law he had no chance of recovery because the liability
there for a shipowner ended with the freight and the vessel. Under
Portuguese or English law indemnity in such an instance was per-
mitted. Which law was to apply? Both the Queens Bench Division
and the Exchequer Chamber decided upon the law of France as it
was the law of the flag. Thus, on the decision standing alone, one
can say that the law of the flag is a choice of law rule which may
be used in bill of lading cases to decide upon the validity of clauses
in such bills. This, to this writer, is not an irrational extension of
the rule in Lloyd v. Guibert. Closer investigation of the reasoning
behind the choice of law of the flag reveals some interesting thoughts
by the learned judges; Willes, J. in particular provides the real
ratio decidendi when he observes that "the rights of the parties to
a contract are to be judged by that law by which they intended, or
rather by which they may justly be presumed, to have bound them-
selves. We must apply this test successively to the various laws which
have been suggested as applicable."9 Willes, J. then caps the decision
by laying down what he refers to as a "general rule," that "where
the contract of affreightment does not provide otherwise ... the law
of the ship should govern [and this is] not only in accordance with
the probable intention of the parties, but also most convenient to
those engaged in commerce.
'' °
A distinction is suggested by the facts in Lloyd v. Guibert. As
that case deals with the authority of a master in a foreign port to
pledge the ship, and is concerned with the governing law of such
a transaction, those cases which fall into approximately the same fact
pattern may be placed in one category, while those which deal with
the validity of clauses in a bill of lading may be placed in another.
The reason behind this division will become apparent shortly. To
glance quickly at three cases coming after Lloyd v. Guibert and in
the first category, i.e., having similar facts to that case, we find that
in 1869, a shipment was enroute from the United States to England;
the vessel put in at Bermuda for repairs and, once again, a bottomry
" Id. at 123.
.. Lloyd v. Guibert, (1865) L.R. I Q.B. 115.
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bond was involved."' The court applied the law of the flag on the
same basis-intention-as did the court in Lloyd v. Guibert. Simi-
larly, in The Gaetano and Maria,"' shipment was on an Italian vessel
to England, bottomry in Portugal, and the law of the flag was ap-
plied for the same reason. Also, in The August,"' involving a ship-
ment from Singapore to England on a German vessel, when the master
sold the cargo of pepper in an intermediate port it was decided that
he was acting correctly and in accordance with the law of the flag
and no liability resulted.
This category, headed by Lloyd v. Guibert, in which masters'
authority is being questioned, is typified by that decision, applying as
it does the law of the flag. The rationale behind such an application
should not be put aside, however; it forms the real "reason for
deciding" the case.
In the second category, which is much more pertinent to this
work since it involves cases wherein some clause in the bill of lading
is in question and deals with the problems of applicable law, a number
of cases form the background for a different manner of thinking.
One of the earliest cases,". involving an insurance clause in a bill of
lading covering a shipment from England to Canada, provides an
analogous situation to a negligence clause set of facts and there the
English court decided that "the bill of lading, having been made in
England by the master of an English ship, is a contract to be governed
and interpreted by English law. . . ."' 0 While it is true that intention
does not expressly enter into the court's decision, the citation of
Lloyd v. Guibert as the case upon which the court relied in reaching
such a decision is thought to be important. Two cases in 18 8 3 take us
further along the road to final formulation of a thesis. One"' is an
insurance clause case as was Moore v. Harris and, using Lloyd v.
Guibert, reaches the same position as Moore v. Harris. It is included
here because it is an American case and provides a more complete
picture of the reasoning of the times. The second".7 is again an English
case but is more concerned with the immediate problem, for it con-
cerns a bill of lading that does contain a negligence clause and is
one of the strongest cases in the chain. A claim was advanced that the
law of the flag should be applied to determine the validity of this
"' Droege & Co. v. Stuart & Simpson, (1869) L.R. 2 P.C. 505.
102(1882) 7 P.D. 137.
'" (1891) P. 328.
"
4
Moore v. Harris, (1876) 1 A.C. 318 (P.C. Can.).
'' Id. at 331.
"..The Titania, 19 Fed. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1883).




clause, but the court denied this and in so doing directed itself solely
to a search for the intention of the parties." ' It will be noticed from
the quotation taken from the decision, set forth in the footnote
below, that the place given to the law of the flag is that of a pre-
sumption; and if looking at the circumstances surrounding the case
one can ascertain sufficient intention to have some other law apply,
then the presumption will be rebutted. It is then apparent that if
the search for the facts does not reveal such an intention, the pre-
sumption will prevail and the law of the flag will be the governing
law. Is it now possible to say that intention must be found to rebut
the prima facie presumption of the law of the flag and if none
appears, application of that law will follow? If the affirmative is
forthcoming, then it can be claimed that the law of the flag is being
applied objectively and not because the parties intend such, contrary
to the thesis of the writer. Investigation of subsequent cases is reveal-
ing on this point.
In an American case of 1886,"' the court expressly repudiated the
law of the flag as controlling the validity of a negligence clause in
a bill of lading saying such a theory is "but a concise phrase to express
a simple fact, namely, the law of the country to which the ship
belongs, and whose flag she bears.. .. ""' Basing the choice of appli-
cable law on another ground, the court remarked that "the most
frequent and controlling reasons are the actual or presumed intent
of the parties. . . .- Notice that there is no mention of a presump-
tion for the law of the flag, but simply a resolution based on inten-
tion. Similarly, an English decision11 a few years later held that while
the flag of the vessel was a fact to be taken into account, to reach
intention, reliance must be placed on all facts taken together.113 It
is interesting to note here that the lower court had decided that the
law of the flag should be the presumed law unless the parties had
intended otherwise, as in the Chartered Mercantile Bank case. A con-
'O
8 Id. at 529:
"It is true the bill of lading was given by the captain of a ship which . . .
carried the Dutch flag; and it was suggested that on that account the con-
tract must be considered as a Dutch contract . . . it seems to me that the
contract is nevertheless English. It may be true in one sense to say that
where the ship carries the flag of a particular country, prima facie the con-
tract made by the captain of that ship is a contract made according to the law
of the country whose flag the ship carries. But that is not conclusive. The
question what the contract is, and by what rule it is to be construed, is
a question of the intention of the parties, and one must look at all the cir-
cumstances and gather from them what was the intention of the parties."1
°
9 The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 373 (S.D. N.Y. 1886).
"Old. at 383.
.S The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 373, 384 (S.D. N.Y. 1886).
'The Industrie, (1894) P. 58.
'13 Id. at 73.
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tinuance is had then of the analysis of The Brantford City case, viz.,
intention is to be looked at from the beginning without the interven-
tion of a presumption in favor of the law of the flag.
This analysis is furthered in a case which takes us into the twentieth
century;" ' although counsel urged application of the law of the flag
to clauses in a charter-party, ' the court decided English law was
the correct choice solely because of the intention of the parties,
which once again was gathered from the facts presented.
Mention should be made of the analysis of a noted author. The
rule as stated by the editors of Dicey may be summarized thusly:
The proper law of the contract of affreightment is controlling as to
validity of the contract, and if one can ascertain from the surround-
ing circumstances what the intention of the parties was, this is the
proper law; lacking such finding, "the law of the flag is the proper
law of the contract.' 18 The comment to this rule proves most en-
lightening, for it states that the law of the flag as the proper law in
the absence of intention to the contrary does not appear in "any
modern decision . . . as the decisive factor in selecting the law appli-
cable to a contract made before the commencement of the voy-
age. . . ,... Close attention to the last few words is cautioned, for
the editors do regard contracts made by the master as subject to the
initially postulated rule. That is, in cases which fall into the first
category set up herein, the law of the flag can be used of its own
force unless intention of the contracting parties can be found to the
contrary. Thus, if a master burdens his vessel and freight and the
cargo of the shipper with a bottomry bond at some intermediate stage
of the voyage for example, according to Dicey's rule this kind of
case may be subject to the presumption of the application of the law
of the flag.1 ' With this thesis the present writer has no real quarrel,
and agrees wholeheartedly with Dicey that in all other cases the
law of the flag not only in modern cases has not had any application
by itself, but as a guide for the future it is not an acceptable choice.
Only intention yields the applicable law.
A brief look now at a few modern cases and it will be seen how
this thesis fares. While the English case of The Torni.1. has been
criticized and has probably been overruled on other grounds than
14 Aktienelskap August Freuchen v. Steel Hansen, (1919) 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 393.
... Id. at 396 (which would have been Norwegian law).
... Dicey, op. cit. supra note 97, at 823.
.. Id. at 825.
. On this point, see as well, Graveson, The Conflict of Laws 199 (3d ed. 1955);
Scrutton, Charterparties 25 (1955); Wolff, Private International Law 435 (2d ed. 1950).
'"9 (1932) P. 27.
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those in which we are here interested, 2 ' it is a case where intention
was the deciding factor and even here, just one year after The
Adriatic, we find the court saying, "No one has suggested here that
the law of the flag should govern the contract.."'. . One should not
be too hasty in concluding that in new cases arising the law of the
flag will have no significance; this is too broad a generalization and
the thesis of this writer does not extend that far. A 1936 case '"
points the way and contains perhaps the best possible conclusion on
the place of the law of the flag. It was there decided that in those
instances where the master must enter into contracts during the
course of the voyage, the law of the flag should prevail. As concerns
the contract of affreightment on the other hand, no presumption as
to the law of the flag applies, and intention is the decisive factor.
Once again, however, caution must be injected for even in the cases
of this second category, the law of the flag is not lost sight of
altogether. It does enter into the mass of facts from which the court
may extract intention when such is not expressed and must therefore
be implied. Consequently, in a very recent case," 3 the court said
that intention decides the governing law and, if expressed, controls;
if not expressed, intention must be presumed from the terms of the
contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances. "In coming to
its conclusion the court will be guided by rules which indicate that
particular facts or conditions lead to a prima facie inference .. .as
to the intention of the parties to apply a particular law: for example,
• .. the country under whose flag the ship, in which the goods are
contracted to be carried, sails...".4 This thinking was continued by
an English court the following year."'
Thus, insofar as the question of the choice of law to determine
validity of clauses in bills of lading is concerned, the law of the
flag has descended the scale from a rule standing alone to be applied
of itself, to the later position of a presumption which was open to
rebuttal in the face of a contrary intention, and finally to its current
status as one of the factors to be taken into account in those instances
where the parties have expressed no intention and a gathering process
120 Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277, 299-300 (P.C.
N.S.). See, as well, Case Note, 3 Modern L. Rev. 62 (1939); Note, 5 Camb. L.J. 100
(1935).
"'. (1932) P. 39.
"2 The Njegos, (1936) P. 90.
12'The Metamorphosis, (1953) 1 Weekly L.R. 543.
121 Id. at 547. See, as well, Kadel Chajkin v. Mitchell Gotts & Co., (1948) 64 T.L.R.
89 (K.B.).
.. The Assunzione, (1954) P. 150.
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is used to imply such. We can not dismiss it altogether but neither
can we use it in any other manner. '
D. Law Upholding As Valid
A small number of cases have been decided on the basis that the
correct choice of law rule to govern validity of contracts is that law
which will hold the contract valid."7 Thus, if a contract is made in
one state to be performed in another, and one state holds the con-
tract valid and the other would declare it invalid, under this rule
the correct choice would be the former. Thus, in Pritchard v.
Norton,"' although it is primarily a place of performance case,
buttressing for the selection of this place was made on the ground
that that law would make it valid, and the parties, when they entered
into the contract, must have done so with this in mind. The first
facet of this holding is, of course, quite obvious: standing behind
and in fact supporting such a rule is the presumed intention of the
parties. The rule has always had such reasoning behind it. As inten-
tion is the key, the position of this choice of law rule approximates
that of the preceding ones, i.e., one can say that although choice of
governing law has been made by a court and that place is the lex
loci solutionis or perhaps the law of the flag, it remains true that the
choice is teleological rather than geographical. A few more words
ought to be said, however, as the theory has received some attention
and some support.
First, it should be stated that the rule as it first existed (in
Pritchard v. Norton and others)' is insupportable in the light of
Professor Dicey's scathing denunciation that, "If you look to the
intention of the parties, you are bound to presume that they meant
to contract with reference to the law which makes the contract
valid. Hence, where there is a question between two possible laws
26 Professor Kahn-Freund writing, in 1939, a note on the Vita Food case, put it this
way: "The gradual elimination of the law of the flag and its replacement by the law which
the parties may be deemed to have intended to govern their maritime contract works in
the same direction." 3 Modern L. Rev. 61, 62 (1939). Cases in the United States on this
point are relatively few but a 1949 decision involving articles and wages indicates that the
law of the flag in this country is in the same position. Chinchilla v. Foreign Tankship
Corp., 1949 Am. Mar. Cas. 2104. There the court remarked: "If the 'law of the flag' applies
in rigor to all cases, Panama law would govern; but we can hardly say that it does. (Cites
cases.) And while parties to a transaction do not have complete autonomy in the choice
of law that governs that transaction (cites cases), circumstances may indicate that for
some purpose they refer to the law of a sovereign other than the one which would normally
govern as controlling in a limited way their respective rights and duties; and those indi-
cations will be respected."
127 For a list of American decisions so holding, see Recent Decision, 40 Colum. L. Rev.
521 n.23 (1940).
1" 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 124 (1882).
"" Notably, Jones v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., (1924) 2 K.B. 730 and British South
Africa Co. v. DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd., (1910) 2 Ch. 502.
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under one of which a contract is, and under the other of which a
contract is not, valid, the contract must always be held valid. But
this result is absurd .. . 30
Perhaps the leading exponent of this choice of law rule, Professor
Lorenzen, has been largely responsible for the continuance of the
rule today, sparse as the applications of it are. Writing in the early
1930's, Lorenzen thought that a court when confronted with a
contract action which involved a choice of law problem should hold
the contract valid and enforceable "if the local law of any state
with which the contract has a substantial connection be satisfied."'
1
To this he inserted two provisos: one, that some stringent policy of
the place of contracting did not prohibit execution of such a contract
and, two, that performance at the place of performance was not
illegal. It will be noted that such a reliance on "substantial connec-
tion" would absolve Lorenzen of the absurdity charge laid by
Dicey, for if the law of the place holding valid must also be sub-
stantially connected with the contract, the element of objectivity
enters and provides a stabilizing factor. While Lorenzen did not
mean that the law of the place holding valid and which is sub-
stantially connected is the applicable law because presumably that
was what the parties intended, he did agree that the same result
would come about if the presumed intention factor was the support-
ing base.'
We can safely say today that Lorenzen's admonition to use the
law with which the contract was substantially connected, and which
would hold the contract valid as a distinct alternative to the intention
theory, has had no acceptance. None of the cases, both before and
after Lorenzen wrote, decides choice of law on this basis; those few
130 Dicey, Conflict of Laws 964-65 (1932). This is not the latest edition of Dicey,
but the happenings between 1932 and the latest issue (1958) have had influence on the
editors of this work. Such will be seen shortly.
... Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws 30 Yale L.J. 655,
673 (1921). This is the second in a series of three articles on the subject by Professor
Lorenzen. The others are in 30 Yale L.J. 565 (1921) and 31 Yale L.J. 53 (1922).
... Ibid. The writings of two skilled conflict of laws men have adopted the second of
these alternatives and placed the intent factor first. Professor Stumberg agreed with
Lorenzen that any law with which the contract had a substantial connection and would
uphold the validity of the contract should be the choice (he could not agree to the first
proviso and maintained that the second one-no illegality at the place of performance-
was all that was needed) but note why: "To apply the law which will uphold the contract,
if the contract has some bona fide substantial connection with the place of that law,
would, it is believed, in carrying out the purposes which the parties had in view in their
negotiations, better serve business convenience by making their acts legally, that which
they purport to be; i.e., an enforceable promise." Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 240 (1951).
Intention then is at the root of Stumberg's choice. Similarly, Professor Rabel, after sur-
veying the field, announced that "In its nature, distinctly emphasized by the English
writers, the selection of the validating law has been dependent upon the assumed intention
of the parties." 2 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws 477 (1950).
1961]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
that do adopt the law upholding the contract as valid as the appli-
cable law do so because this is taken to be in line with the presumed
intention of the parties. 3 Thus, the answer to the choice of law
problem in questions involving negligence clauses in bills of lading
does not lie here.
E. Law Of The Place Of Breach
Some courts and a few writers have declared that the correct choice
of law to govern validity of a limitation of liability or an exemption
from liability in a bill of lading is the law of that place where the
injury occurred or damages were suffered. A closer look at these
declarations must be had in our survey of the possible choices available.
Professor Beale, in dealing with the choice of the law of the place
of performance, observed that "some courts have considered that
both the carriage and delivery are parts of the performance of a
contract of carriage, that this performance regularly governs the
validity of a contract . . . , the law of the place of that particular
part of the performance which was occurring when the breach
occurred, that is, the law of the place of injury or loss governs the
validity of a limitation of liability.' '.. According to this idea, the
performance is split into as many parts as there are jurisdictions
through which the carriage travels, and if a breach resulting in injury
or damage occurs in one of these, that law determines the validity
of, for example, a negligence clause in the bill of lading covering
the shipment. While it is possible to place the applicable law in a
place of performance category or a place of injury category under
this plan, it is perhaps correct to say that, in the light of the cases
that Professor Beale cites as authority for his statement, the place of
injury was paramount. Let us look at these cases.
With the exception of two, with which we will deal in a moment,
all are domestic railroad cases and selection of one is thought sufficient.
In Hughes v. Pennsylvania R.R.,"' a contract was entered into in
New York for carriage of a horse by rail to Pennsylvania. The
bill contained a limitation of liability provision which was valid
according to New York law but invalid in Pennsylvania. Injury
13 A glance at any of these representative cases will show this to be true. Peninsular
& Oriental Steam Nay. Co. v. Shand, 3 Moore N.S. 272, 16 Eng. Rep. 103 (P.C. 1865);
In re Missouri S.S. Co., (1889) 58 L.J. Ch. 721, (on these two cases see Graveson, op. cit.
supra note 118, at 13-14); and more recently, N.V. Handel Maatschappi J. Smits v.
English Exports (London) Ltd., (1955) 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 317. A great many United
States cases on this point are usury cases; e.g., see Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867),
where the court said "men are not presumed by the law to act in folly or dishonestly, but
rather that they intended in good faith that their acts shall be valid and what they
purport to be."
1342 Beale, The Conflict of Laws 1189 (1935).
"5202 Pa. 222, 51 Atl. 990 (1902), aff'd, 191 U.S. 477 (1903).
[Vol. 15
CONFLICT OF LAW
occurred in Pennsylvania. The court chose the law of Pennsyl-
vania as the law to govern the validity of the stipulation because
that was the place of injury. In so choosing, the court left no
doubt as to its reasoning: "Where a contract containing a stipula-
tion limiting liability for negligence is made in one state, but
with a view to its performance by transportation through or into
one or more other states, we see no reason why it should not be con-
strued in accordance with the law of the state where its negligent
breach, causing injury, occurs.""13
In the two maritime cases which Beale cites as authority for the
above quotation, not quite so clear an authority is forthcoming. In
the first one,'37 shipment was made from Genoa to New York on an
English vessel under a bill of lading which exempted the carrier
from liability for damage negligently caused by "leakage, stowage,
or peril of the seas." The court, in the United States, concluded that
the damage was the result of the final exception, peril of the sea due
to the heavy weather encountered on the passage. Unless the stowage
was negligent there was no possibility of liability for this, and the
court concluded that from the evidence presented all possible care
in the stowage had been taken. It did remark, in dictum, that if
there was negligence in the stowage, this was an event which occurred
in Genoa and there the exception in the bill was valid and no re-
covery could be had on that ground in any case. From this judg-
ment, Professor Beale concludes that the law of the place of injury
determines the validity of the negligence clause. Is this a correct
conclusion? It is true that if there was negligent stowage it occurred
in Genoa, but the court finds the damage was inflicted on the high
seas and this surely must have been the place of injury, i.e., the place
where the final act took place. Accordingly, if any law was to be
chosen as the law of the place of injury it would have to be the
law of the flag, England. It is true that by English law the exculpa-
tory clause was valid as it was by Italian law, but the point which
Beale attempts to make is that Italian law is the correct choice to
be applied to determine validity of this clause. There are, it is
suggested, two things which one can question about the use made
of this decision by Beale: First, the part of the case on which he
relies is pure dictum, and, second, his choice of Italy as the place
where the injury occurred is probably not correct. One must admit,
however, that the court does seem to lean toward place of injury as
the governing law and it is possible, as a last resort, to use the case
.36 202 Pa. at 228-29, 51 At. at 992.
137 The Trinacria, 42 Fed. 863 (S.D. N.Y. 1890),
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as a lead into a place of injury thesis. The second admiralty case
which Beale cites as authority will disclose this reasoning.
A cargo of wine was shipped from the city of Cognac in France
to Havre by rail and thence by steamer to the United States. A
negligence clause was included in the bill of lading which was issued
at Cognac and was evidently intended to cover the entire shipment.
Somewhere on the land transit one of the casks was damaged. The
court, once again in the United States, decided that if the assump-
tion is made that the bill of lading covered the entire shipment-
Cognac to New York-then it must follow that the negligence
clause applies to the whole carriage. The injury occurred in France,
not on the high seas, and the negligence clause was valid in France.
The court came to the conclusion that as to acts of negligence
occurring in France, the law of France must prevail and "as no
cause of action arises according to the law of the jurisdiction within
which the injury occurred, none . . . can be recognized here. Such
was the view expressed in the case of the Trinacria. . .. ""'
There is not much doubt in this case that the decision of the case
is support for Professor Beale's statement. The court quite clearly
has upheld the validity of the negligence clause by choosing as the
governing law, the place of injury. If one construes these two cases
very broadly, it can be concluded that if damage to goods occurs on
land before the ship is at sea, then the law of that place will determine
the validity of any negligence clause which may be included in the
covering bill of lading, as that place is the place of injury. This
reasoning can not be safely taken further to include damage caused
by negligence of the carrier on the high seas. Both of these cases
expressly state... that they are not dealing with instances where
damage is incurred on the high seas; therefore, we can conclude that
as to such an event, no ruling is forthcoming from these two cases.
The rule can not be dismissed entirely, however, without further
investigation, for Professor Beale is not alone in his contention. 4 ' We
's3 Baetjer v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 59 Fed. 789 (S.D. N.Y. 1894).
"', "It is a wholly different question whether the courts of this country should sus-
tain contracts or stipulations, as regards acts performed and designed to be performed,
either on the high seas or within the exclusive jurisdiction of this country .... " The
Trinacria, 42 Fed. 863, 864 (S.D. N.Y. 1890).
"To acts of negligence and consequent damage occurring, not on the high seas, but
within foreign territory, the law of that jurisdiction must . . . prevail." Baetjer v. La
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 59 Fed. 789 (S.D. N.Y. 1894).
140 Professor Graveson remarked that "according to the Restatement the limitation of
liability for maritime torts (which may well arise in relation to the obligation under a
bill of lading) depends on the lex fori." (Emphasis added.) Graveson, Bills of Lading and
the Unification of Maritime Law in the English Courts, The Conflict of Laws and Inter-




must ask then: How correct is an application of the law of the
place of injury to determine validity of a clause in a bill of lading?
First, the cases which deal with the liability of a carrier to its
passengers must be set aside. It might be mentioned, however, that
the choice of the place of injury is not open to nearly as much
criticism in passenger as it is in cargo cases, chiefly because of matters
of policy."1 Restricting this study to cargo cases, however, and
setting aside the railroad cases which are of little aid in pursuit of
a uniform rule for maritime law, what we have to pursue so far is
the choice of the place of injury. The criticism which appears
immediately is that somehow, somewhere, a shift has been made from
a basis ex contractu to one ex delicto. For in applying the law of
the place of injury, one is applying a rule of tort law. Should this
be? If one agrees that where the carrier is sued by the shipper in an
action for damages alleging the negligence of the carrier, that this
must remain a delictual matter, it is then possible to bring in the
place of injury as the applicable law. If this is allowed and a ship-
ment originates in Boston and is destined to call at Halifax, Nova
Scotia, St. John's, Newfoundland, Glasgow, Scotland and Southhamp-
ton, England before final off-loading in Hamburg, Germany, suppose
an act of negligence occurs first in the mid-Atlantic. What law
should apply? The only possible choice is the law of the flag, as
that is the closest one can come to a place of injury. Accordingly,
the validity of the negligence clause is now determined according
to the law of Liberia, as this is a Liberian freighter.
If negligent action on the part of the crew causes damage in any
of the ports of call, the law of the flag need not be brought in, as
fictions have a place only in otherwise non-explainable cases. So we
have either Canadian, Scottish, or English law to apply depending
on the locale. There is no difficulty in choosing the law, as the place
of injury is evident. Do we then conclude that the ultimate has been
reached? If we do, we are forgetting the parties back in Massachusetts
who by this time are liable to be somewhat bewildered.
Can one in all fairness say that the carrier has been fairly dealt
with under this choice? He has included in his contract a clause
which he has no idea will be upheld as valid or invalid. (While the
negligence clause in a bill issued in Boston would be invalid by
Cogsa in a court in the United States, one should not forget that
it may not be a negligence clause which is under discussion or, of
even more importance, that the shipment originated, not in Boston
141 See Dicey, op. cit. supra note 97, at 831; Graveson, op. cit. supra note 118; Hutch-
inson, Carriers 220 (1906); Williston, Contracts § 1113 (1936).
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but Buenos Aires and did contain a negligence clause.) Is it not only
equitable to give him the benefit of knowing before the shipment is
made whether the clauses in the bill of lading will be upheld so
that he may either insure or increase the freight?4 ' After the damage
has been occasioned it is too late for him to do either; knowledge
beforehand is therefore essential, and any application of the then
unknown place of injury is hazardous indeed to his position.
It is suggested, on the other hand, that to treat the matter on a
contractual rather than a delictual basis will be much more satisfying
to all parties. When the court is confronted with a damage suit
brought by the plaintiff shipper on a tortious base and the defense
is raised by the defendant carrier of a contractual clause which will
exempt him from liability, it is thought that the court should not
continue to decide the validity of this excuse for nonperformance on
a delictual ground. Realistically, it is apparent that the entire obliga-
tion rests on a contractual base. If it were not for the contract of
carriage there would be no obligation; the obligation only comes
from the agreement, and damage to the cargo which may give rise
to liability can only be based on that contract. Hence, the validity
of the clause, it is thought, must also be classed as a contractual and
not as a delictual matter. The mere bringing of the suit in tort by
the shipper does not change the fundamental obligation assumed by
the parties in the contract. The carrier owes no duty to the shipper
except under that contract, and the writer can not agree that the
rights and obligations assumed under that contract can be in-
creased or decreased by a change in the form of action which the
plaintiff may use. The obligation, it bears repeating, is purely con-
tractual; to switch to a delictual base to decide the validity of a
clause in that contract, it is submitted, is entirely erroneous. If the
matter is continued as a question of validity of contract, the place
of injury has no place and as a choice of law rule to decide validity
of a negligence clause in a bill of lading it must be discarded.'
F. Lnv Of The Forum
In the famous case of Robinson v. Bland,' which has survived
chiefly because of the opening wedge of autonomy driven by Lord
'42 See Morris, supra note 96, at 507.
1423 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws 244-45 (1950), has this to say of the use of the
place of injury to decide validity of clauses in a bill of lading: "This view ought to
be entirely abandoned; it is due to a confusion between contract and tort." And again
at 257; "Another connecting factor no longer seriously to be considered is the place
where the goods are lost, destroyed or damaged. This local connection enjoyed some favor
in American and other courts, but has nothing to recommend it with respect to a voyage
contractually assumed by one carrier on one vessel. Only by confusion of tort and con-
tract could such a view originate in actions sounding in contract."
142 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1760).
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Mansfield, there is a remark by Mr. Justice Denison which requires
passing attention. He states that "the plaintiff has appealed to the
laws of England, by bringing his action here; and ought to be
determined by them..'.'. A clear indication by the Justice that his
opinion was fixed on the law of the forum as the applicable law in
any conflict of law problem is thus portrayed. If a person sues in
the court of Z, it makes no difference what the facts are, the law
of Z applies. How appealing this is to anyone who has been at all
immersed in any choice of law problem; but how shallow a choice
it is soon becomes evident when one considers that by choosing the
forum the plaintiff can choose the decision and this, of course, is
the raison d'etre for a "system" of conflict of laws. It is patently
obvious that the law of the forum will not suffice'. as a choice of
law rule simply for that reason.
It may be said with some certainty that the law of the forum has
not found any acceptance as a choice of law rule, standing alone.
In other words, it is not available to the court as a choice of law
rule, for example, to decide on the validity of the negligence clause.
Accordingly, we need not worry about it in our pursuit of a uniform
choice of law rule.
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE FINAL Two AVAILABLE
CHOICE OF LAW RULES
Up to this point, a study has been made of the first six of the
eight possible choice of law rules which are submitted as available
to a court in deciding upon the validity of a negligence clause in an
ocean bill of lading. One should keep in mind the limited spheres
within which validity of such clauses can be questioned, for this
facet of the topic will become of more importance in these final two
choice of law rules. It should also be remembered that it is the sub-
mission of the writer that none of the choices previously considered
is suitable, for varying reasons. Only two possibilities remain; either
a completely new rule is to be invented or a selection made from the
remaining two.
The two remaining choice of law rules are treated apart from
the others for two reasons: the first is that they can best be handled
together as they meet at certain points and at others they merge.
There is some transference back and forth; and while the basic
propositions underlying each are quite radically different, they are
at times confused by some and too easily distinguished by others.
145 Id. at 720.
141 See Quarrier v. Colston, 1 Ph. 146, 41 Eng. Rep. 587 (Ch. 1842).
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The second reason that separate treatment is believed necessary lies
in the nature of the choices themselves; they are necessarily some-
what nebulous and, at times, rather difficult to grasp. It is felt how-
ever, that this adds to rather than detracts from their usefulness.
What is meant by "autonomy" as a choice of law rule? Autonomy
contemplates that law which the parties to the contract agree upon
expressly, tacitly, or impliedly'47 as the law to be applicable to and
to govern their contract. With this in mind, it becomes necessary
once again to look into history to see how this has fared as a choice
of law rule in the particular area under discussion, and, of necessity,
its periphery, to best provide a forecast for the future. There is no
paucity of material-primary and secondary-for this task, as it
truly may be called "the most intricate question of Private Inter-
national Law.,
148
While there is some doubt as to the origins of the theory of
autonomy,149 there is none as to its wide use until the present. Just
how broad has been the use will become evident presently. To begin
the discussion, selection of the first of the three divisions of autonomy
outlined in the definition, that of express agreement as to applicable
law, will serve as an introduction to the topic.
A. Express Selection Of Applicable Law By The Parties
Cases in England, Canada,10 and the United States illustrate the
first proposition, viz., that the parties are free to select the law which
they wish to govern their contracts. If one could make this simple
statement and leave it, practically all of the problems in this field
would disappear. However, no case has ever been decided solely by
application of this first proposition standing alone; courts have either
at one end restricted it slightly by qualifying remarks,"1 or have
almost destroyed it completely by too-heavy burdens.11 It will be
the task of this section to illustrate the boundaries by means of
14 Definitions of these three forms will appear shortly.
148 Szaszy, Choice of Law By the Parties to a Contract, 20 The Grotius Society 156
(1935).
" Dumoulin, the French lawyer of the sixteenth century, is most often looked upon
as the originator of the theory. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1909); Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts, 51 Yale L.J. 893,
895 (1942); Wolff, Choice of Law in International Contracts, 49 Jurid. Rev. 110, 114
(1937); Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 341, 342 (1952).
'"0 This part will concentrate on cases in the United States and England. Reference to
any of the following Canadian cases will illustrate the position there. Vipond v. Furness,
Withy & Co., (1917) 35 D.L.R. 278; The Canada Sugar Ref. Co. v. Furness, Withy &
Co., (1905) 27 Qui. C.S. 502; Mathys v. The Manchester Liners, (1904) 25 Qu6 C.S.
42 6.41 E.g., see Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Cent. Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948).
15 E.g., Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946).
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judicial opinions and some few theoretical thoughts by writers on
the subject. A later section will be used to forecast.
Certainly the most famous case on express selection of applicable
law by the parties is that of Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Ship-
ping Co."' Here, a cargo of fish was shipped from Newfoundland
(at that time a separate Dominion) to the United States on a vessel
registered in the Province of Nova Scotia, Canada. Through in-
advertence a bill of lading of ancient origin was selected by the
carrier, one which did not conform to the Newfoundland version of
the Brussels Convention, as required by that legislation, and one
which, in fact, contained a negligence clause. In addition, another
clause provided that "this contract shall be governed by English
law." The fish were damaged as a result of negligence on the part
of the carrier's agents and suit was initiated in Nova Scotia to re-
cover for the loss. The carrier relied on the negligence clause and,
in the final appeal to the Privy Council, it was decided that the
carrier was exonerated by the clause; it was valid according to the
stipulated English law. In so holding, the Privy Council at last
brought into clear focus the scope of party autonomy. In the leading
English case..4 on the subject prior to the Vita Food decision, Lord
Atkin, in speaking of that instance where an expressed intention is
evident, remarked that "their intention will be ascertained by the
intention expressed in the contract if any, which will be con-
clusive..''. Lord Wright, in the Vita Food case, relies upon this state-
ment and, in applying it in his decision of the case, apparently settles
the matter in a most succinct fashion. The objection had evidently
been advanced that the statement by Lord Atkin had been too broad
and that some qualification should be imposed. Lord Wright now
proceeds to state his views and it is here that the new departure is
begun. He states that "where the English rule that intention is the
test applies, and where there is an express statement by the parties
of their intention to select the law of the contract, it is difficult to
see what qualifications are possible, provided the intention expressed
is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding
the choice on the ground of public policy."
6
If the writer may presume to paraphrase for the sake of clarity
and emphasis, it is clear that following this case, if two parties
expressly stipulate for the application of the law of X, and this is
(1939) A.C. 277 (P.C. N.S.).
114 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft,
(1937) A.C. 500 (Eng.).
Id. at 529.
'" Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277 (P.C. N.S.).
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done in good faith, and nothing in such a selection is illegal or con-
trary to public policy, then this is a valid step and one which will be
upheld and applied. There are no other qualifications or restrictions.
One can say that there are two poles around which there are two
theories of autonomy, one which would allow complete freedom
of selection of the governing law, and the other allowing no auto-
nomy at all. As was said earlier, no court has ever gone so far as the
former, nor has any writer, and probably no court today would be
willing to go as far as the latter. Somewhere in between lies the
answer. From the Vita Food decision we get a statement of the first
proposition with the qualifying limitations imposed by Lord Wright.
These will be ignored temporarily, and an investigation will be made
of other courts' reactions to express stipulations, other writers'
theses, and then a survey will be possible of the list of limitations and
it will be an easier task to extract each proposed restriction and study
it not only by itself but aligned alongside its fellows. We have then,
three limitations imposed by the Vita Food decision, viz., good
faith, legality, and no infringement of public policy. There are quite
a few more and it is in order now to investigate them.
Writing in 1937, Martin Wolff, when dealing with the problem
of express selection of law by the parties, made this statement: "To
sum up: the parties may subject their contract to any system of law
with which it is internally connected. They cannot make a system
of law with which the contract has no connection the proper law
of the contract. If they nevertheless do just that, the true proper
law must be ascertained as if no law has been agreed. ... ""'
In a well-known autonomy case in 1937, we find the following
conclusion: "the right of parties to a contract to have their reciprocal
duties and obligations under that contract governed by the law of
some particular jurisdiction is limited to the selection or stipulation
by them of the law of a jurisdiction which has a real relation to
the contract." '58
There are a number of statements paralleling these and they will
be studied in more detail later;159 these two are sufficient to bring to
light a further limitation on the absolute freedom of parties to a
contract to select the law which they desire to govern their contract,
i.e., the limitation which we may call "substantial connection."
The next restrictid4 on complete freedom is also a common holding.
157 Wolff, supra note 149, at 121.
'" Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 RI. 162, 174, 192 Atd. 158, 164 (1937).
'59 See pp. 257-60. '
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One of the leading exponents of this criticism is Professor Beale...
who would disallow completely under his territorial theory any
autonomy at all. It was his opinion that allowing parties to choose
what law would govern their acts amounted to giving them legisla-
tive powers.1"' Judge Learned Hand continued this feeling in a
famous statement in a maritime case when he remarked, "But an
agreement is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be, and
to try to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps.' '..
Once again, more of these statements will be arrayed a little later,
the problem being simply illustrated at the present; it is obvious of
course that if a charge of legislating is upheld we have not a limit-
ing but rather an extinguishing of the express stipulation for
governing law. This, then, is the opposite pole and as we are trying
to find a place between the poles, this will not be of much service.
Before the place is found however, the "legislating" charge will have
to be dismissed and that will be attempted later as well; once again,
it is listed as illustrative of the problems that have to be faced.
A more recent attempted limitation on autonomy, by the writers
at least, is in a particular type of agreement, i.e., that which is known
as the adhesion contract. Perhaps the leading exponent of this limita-
tion, Professor Ehrenzweig, defines such contracts as "agreements
in which one party's participation consists in his mere 'adherence,'
unwilling and often unknowing, to a document drafted unilaterally
and insisted upon by what is usually a powerful enterprise."1 . In
his opinion, in the area of transportation contracts, with which we
are here intimately concerned, not one case has upheld stipulation
for governing law to the disadvantage of the adherent. " He con-
cludes that in the special area of adhesion contracts, the autonomy
doctrine is put aside and a new theory is used which deals with
adhesion alone to help the otherwise helpless adherent. Some judicial
opinion follows the same vein,"' and hence another limitation is
added to the list.
Finally, to complete the list of limitations, some restrictions must
be noted which are beyond dispute and are here accepted as being
16. Beale, it is respectfully submitted, destroys some of the value of his thoughts by an
apparently unnecessary attack on Lord Mansfield and other "transplanters" of the civil
law. See Beale, supra, note 149, at 8.
"' "The fundamental objection to this in point of theory is that it involves permission
to the parties to do a legislative act. It practically makes a legislative body of any two
persons who choose to get together and contract." Beale, supra note 149
...E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (ti Cir. 1931).
163 Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072,
1075 (1953).
'"Id. at 1085-86.
161See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
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binding without further argument. Heading this list is the limita-
tion on party autonomy that matters which are considered procedural
are for the lex fori alone and the parties can not displace these by
stipulation in the contract. Similarly, in some well-defined areas,
statutory provisions have lifted the power of stipulation from the
hands of the parties, the best known example occurring in the law
of insurance. "' In a few instances, the applicable law to govern the
form of the contract and capacity of the parties may be beyond the
reach of the parties' power. "7
Accepting this last category as limitations on complete autonomy,
we are left with the following: If we adopt all of the other restric-
tions as being valid, only this can be said: parties to a contract can
stipulate for governing law if such a stipulation is (1) bona fide,
(2) legal, (3) not against public policy, (4) for the law of a place
which has a reasonable connection with the contract, and (5) not
a contract of adhesion. When this definition is compounded with
the additional burdens of the requirements that the matter be neither
procedural nor have to do with form or capacity, and is not within
the ambit of the "standardized contracts," and finally, that the
stipulation is not such that the parties may be called "legislators,"
intention of the parties as a choice of law rule to govern the validity
of negligence clauses in bills of lading, so that more uniformity may
be achieved in this field, begins to lose its initial appeal. Accordingly,
the solution is clear: some of the problems must be solved or another
choice must be made. Before moving on, it would be only fair to
investigate the intention theory with some of the limitations re-
moved, for it may be the answer. Let us then attempt to dispose of
some of the limitations to see if some formula less encumbered is
possible.
If we can dispose of the legislation charge, then at least we can
move away from the "territorial" pole. Along with Beale, Professor
Lorenzen was a critic of autonomy on the same basis; that is, that
the parties become a legislature if allowed to stipulate for applicable
law.'" ' Dean Falconbridge was almost as adamant in his holding that
"we cannot let them go far afield so as to make applicable the law
of any foreign country which happens to be favorable to their views
as to the conditions of a valid contract, and so as to substitute by
I6I am indebted for this group in the main to Professor Yntema's article, supra note
149, at 353.
".. Ibid.
16SLorenzen, supra note 131, at 658.
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a quasi-legislative act some foreign law for the law which otherwise
ought to govern the contract. '')
ss
There are two things which can be said of the charge of legislat-
ing; one is essentially theoretical, the other practical. In the the-
oretical area, one must ask: When the parties stipulate for applicable
law, what are they really doing? Only two answers are possible. One
is that they are in fact making law by selecting law and if such is
true, the legislating charge is a valid one and intention as a choice
of law rule must be dropped. While one, with Kelsen, may agree
that individuals do create norms by their private transactions by
virtue of a higher norm in the hierarchy,70 in the area of making
law by simply declaring law, the legislature has preempted the field
completely. The second answer is that the parties, when they stipu-
late, are not themselves making law, and they are not deciding on
the validity of the contract by simply stating what law they wish
to govern it; they are simply choosing which law shall govern their
contract. When parties in their contract say "this is a valid contract"
this is, true, a law-making attempt; but when they do not by any
effort attempt to say whether or not this is a valid contract, but
simply choose some law to rule on validity, it is difficult to see how
this latter can be classed as a law-making, legislative function.17'
The practical facet of the argument against the legislative charge
is that, if allowed, a stipulation for governing law aids a court in
its search for the correct choice of law rule. This is an accepted pro-
cedure in other instances; in the "pliable" rules field of sales law
no question of legislating has, to the writer's knowledge, been
advanced. Interpretative clauses to aid in resolving ambiguities
are frequently viewed with appreciation by the judiciary without
thought of endangering the separation of powers. Why not ap-
proach the express stipulation in at least a true light and allow the
parties the benefit of the doubt until some proof to the contrary
is forthcoming; if they have included a stipulation for the law
of a particular jurisdiction, is this any more of a law-making pro-
cedure than an interpretation section in a contract or other docu-
ment? Those who adhere to the strict territorial doctrine of the con-
flict of laws must so hold, but we need not all blindly follow."' As
... Falconbridge, Contract and Conveyance in Conflict of Laws, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661,
671-72 (1933).
170 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 137 (1949).
171 See Wolff, supra note 149, at 114.
171 "Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the legislative function, it seems more
realistic to regard them as relieving the courts of the problem of resolving a question of




Professor Beale's thesis of lex loci contractus as the correct choice of
law rule to govern validity of contracts was contrary to the situa-
tion as it existed in the United States, '73 so it may be argued that
his and others' charge of legislating is contra to the stream of judicial
opinion in a large measure. Judge Hand's criticism in the Gerli case
stands practically alone, and Beale himself admitted that "the pre-
vailing tendency of the American cases is to regard the intention of
the parties as controlling . ..""' As such is the case, i.e., as inten-
tion is the leading idea upon which courts are to rely, can any one
suggest a better indication of intention than an express stipulation
for governing law?
Now consider the purported limitation in the area of so-called
"adhesion contracts." It has been recognized for some time that the
powers and abilities of one or the other of the two parties to a ship-
ping contract outweigh considerably the capabilities of their opposite
numbers. In England, the "Brittania rules the waves" theme was
more than mere sentiment, for the carrier was all-powerful. The
reverse situation of course existed in the United States. Much of
this has now changed, due partly to shifts in economies and partly
to shifting emphases. The fact still remains however that one does
not go too far in saying that the shipping companies, particularly
the larger ones, do a fair amount of controlling even yet; this is
evidenced fairly well by some standardized forms of bills of lading
now in use in the industry and the inclusion therein of rather similar
clauses. This "plan" was recognized as early as 1889,17 and according
to Gilmore and Black, in 1957, "the 'contracts,' of course, are dic-
tated by them, and are in fact adopted simultaneously by wide
segments of the trade.
'17
6
It is submitted that to the question of whether the fact of com-
mercial inequality is a proper footing upon which disallowance of
express stipulations for governing law may be based, more than one
answer, as Professor Ehrenzweig's foreclosure proposal, is possible.
In other words, the present writer can not agree with this learned
theorist that in adhesion cases, autonomy is to be supplanted. Thus,
if we divide the ocean contract cases as is done herein, that is into
173 See pp. 214-26 supra.
174 Beale, supra note 149, at 11.
175 "Obviously the individual shipper has no opportunity to repudiate the document
agreed upon by the trade, even if he has actually examined it and all of its twenty-eight
lengthy paragraphs, . . . this lack of equality of bargaining power has long been recognized
in our law; and stipulations for unreasonable exemption of the carrier have not been
allowed to stand." Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S.
397, 441 (1889).
.. Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 155 (1957).
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cargo and passenger compartments, more clarity may be introduced.
In the cargo situation, any clause in a bill of lading of the nature
of a negligence clause which covers a shipment entering or leaving
the United States is void because of the provisions of Cogsa. In this
segment, then, the adhesion theory-like the autonomy theory-has
no place. If the shipment is one which does not fall within the reach
of Cogsa, as a foreign shipment, then while it is true that here
Professor Ehrenzweig's thesis can apply it is thought better to adopt
a less rigid attitude to these cases and handle them on an indi-
vidual basis first. Then, if overwhelming inequality that has in-
fluenced inclusion of favorable-to-the-carrier clauses is found, it is
at least appealing (particularly from the standpoint of flexibility)
to rule on these clauses with tools already available, viz., the rules
as to undue influence, duress," ' and public policy.'78
Mention should be made of Professor Ehrenzweig's inclusion of the
passenger ticket cases in his general adhesion rule. He states here as
well that no case has ever been decided adversely to the adherent by
allowing a stipulation for governing law to be applied. When he
wrote this article (in 1953) this was probably true, at least in the
United States. In 1957, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit did not follow and upheld a stipulation for English
law to the decided disadvantage of the adherent. 7 '
The next purported limitation of autonomy is that of the over-
worked, "lold reliable" fall-back, public policy. While a good many
cases have been decided on a public policy basis, it has apparently
been too appealing to some and the situation is now a little out of
hand. What, for example, did Lord Wright in the Vita Food case
mean by saying that the stipulation was valid and would be upheld
if "there was no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of
public policy"? 8 . Obviously, the central question must be: "whose
public policy"? While the answer is to the writer an obvious one-
the forum's-it has been loosely handled at times and hence the
difficulty. Professor Cook, for example, took the position that if
the public policy of any state with which the contract was factually
"' "The choice of some unknown law may have been imposed upon one party to the
transaction by the other, especially where the latter is occupying an economically or
otherwise dominant position. That danger may be guarded against, however, by the appli-
cation of rules against duress, undue influence, or similar abuses, as they may be found in
every civilized legal system," Rheinstein, Book Review, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 478, 487 (1948).
'..2 Rabel, op. cit. supra 132, at 409; Yntema, Contract and the Conflict of Laws:
"Autonomy" in Choice of Law in the United States, I N.Y.L.F. 46 (1955).
"79Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). The dissenting
opinion of Justice Frank adopts pretty well the position of Professor Ehrenzweig on the
adhesion theory. See 221 F.2d at 205.
... Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277 (P.C. N.S.).
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connected was violated, then the forum ought to deny validity to
such a clause."' 5 Let us apply this to a hypothetical fact situation. A
shipment covered by a bill of lading containing a negligence clause
and a stipulation for the law of Argentina, leaves New York bound
for England. Damage is occasioned the cargo by negligent acts. Suit
is brought in Buenos Aires. Can we say here with Professor Cook
that the public policy against negligence clauses in either or both
England and the United States should have any effect in the courts
of Argentina? Add to this the thought that the negligence clause is a
valid provision in Argentina; is it now logical to say that the public
policy of these two foreign states will influence Argentine courts?
Herein, obviously, lies the danger in the easy tendency to extend
the tool of public policy outside its true ambit. It is thought, there-
fore, that public policy as a limitation on autonomy should in the
first instance be restricted to the public policy of the forum. Applica-
tion of the public policy of the forum must next be considered.
In any shipment which leaves the United States or enters the
United States, public policy will not be in issue; the mandatory rules
of Cogsa take care of the field completely. In those countries of the
world, like England, where the legislative provisions apply to out-
ward shipments only, public policy has no place when such a situa-
tion is under consideration in that state. It would seem then that
in defining public policy and its applicability, if the forum's rules
from Cogsa-like provisions are violated, public policy is not a
determinative factor; if no such provision is violated, then the public
policy of the forum can be applied. This has to be considered more
carefully, however. If not, in a case involving a shipment from
Genoa to Montevideo, negligence clause in the bill of lading, forum
in the United States (Cogsa not applying), the public policy of the
United States could be held to be infringed and the clause held in-
valid. This should not result, however, in a situation where the only
connection with the United States is the place of suit. American
courts in the past have recognized this and held that in completely
foreign shipments, where the carriage and the contract have no
connection with the United States, U. S. public policy will not
deny validity to such clauses simply because such provisions are
invalid in cases where the United States is somehow connected."' s
181 Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties, 34 Ill. L.
Rev. 423, 428-29 (1939).
'"The Miguel di Larrinaga, 217 Fed. 678 (S.D. N.Y. 1914); The Fri, 154 Fed. 333
(2d Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 210 U.S. 431 (1908); and in the Vita Food case itself, while
Lord Wright set forth the public policy requirement for an express stipulation he found
no English public policy against upholding the stipulation for English law in this case
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How does this picture of public policy affect autonomy? It is sub-
mitted that in only one way can it possibly enter the picture, viz.,
if in a bill of lading covering a shipment of goods from the United
States to Great Britain, a stipulation is included for Argentine law,
then here the public policy of the United States could (in a U. S.
forum) preclude allowance of such a stipulation. But even here
there is no need of public policy since the provisions of Cogsa can
handle the situation very nicely."' The same can be said of any
country which has this type of legislation. If, in fact, a shipment
originates in a country which has no Brussels Convention type laws
and that country is the forum, and it has some public policy which
tends to invalidate exculpatory clauses, here it is possible for public
policy to prohibit the escape from the rigors of this policy by
stipulating for some other law where the negligence clause, for ex-
ample, is not frowned upon. It is submitted that this is the only
place for limiting the autonomy of the parties by the application of
public policy.
Taking a further proposed limitation again from the Vita Food
case, investigation must now be had into one of the other two re-
quirements set forth therein by Lord 'Wright, i.e., that the intention
of the parties be "legal." A great deal of the problem connected
with this provision stems from the fact that it is, to the present
writer at least, somewhat difficult to discern just how intention-a
state of mind-can be legal or illegal. If Lord Wright had said the
transaction or the inclusion by the parties of the stipulation for
English law must by itself be legal, then immediately discussion could
ensue on this basis. However, such is not the case. If one agrees that
intention can be neither legal nor illegal, then the proposition comes
to this: in selecting the law of some other jurisdiction, the parties
must not be attempting to evade some law of the place of making
or of the place of performance. To the writer this fraud d la loi
idea is fully contained within the first requirement set up by Lord
Wright, viz., that the parties be bona fide; if this is true, then no
further investigation of the "legal" requirement is necessary. How-
ever, it may be argued that by some clause in the bill of lading-
perhaps a negligence clause-the parties have unwittingly included
a provision which is illegal at the place of making or at the place
of performance, and as the bona fide requirement will not cover
involving, to England, a completely foreign shipment. See, as well, Varnish v. Kheti, (1949)
82 Lloyd's List L.R. 525.
... It was under this type of fact situation that Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish
Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), was decided.
This case, and the present writer's opinion of it will be stated shortly.
1961]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
this, some other condition must take care of it. If this reasoning is
accepted-and it is the submission of the writer that it should not
be-then it is the same as saying that if a contract is invalid or
illegal at the place of contracting, it will be illegal everywhere, re-
gardless of the forum chosen; or if it is illegal by the lex loci
solutionis, it will be illegal everywhere. It is surprising to see the
degree of acceptance of either or both of these statements. Thus,
Greer, L. J. in The Torni, in speaking of the decision in In re
Missouri S.S. Co.,8' remarked that if a contract is illegal at the place
of making then an English court would recognize the invalidity and
hold the contract invalid.'85 Again, in another English case, Scrutton,
L. J. said that if a contract was illegal at the place of performance,
it would be held illegal in an English court.8 Morris, in writing a
casenote on The Torni, agreed with the above statement by Lord
Justice Greer and said, "'In general no contract . ..which is illegal
by the lex loci contractus will be enforced by an English court.' '87
Finally, Dean Falconbridge continues this thesis by saying, "Illegality
by the law of the place of contracting would seem to be a sufficient
ground of invalidity.'
8
The writer respectfully submits that these are statements which,
if they are not begging the question, are clearly erroneous. It is the
writer's opinion as well that validity of a contract is a question first
of choice of law: what law determines the validity of this contract?
To add an addendum to this proposition that illegality at the place
of contracting destroys any possibility of subsequent enforcement
anywhere also destroys any chance of ever having a uniform choice
of law rule in any aspect of the contractual field. An example will
perhaps portray this more clearly. Assume a shipment goes from
Montreal to Hamburg, and that a negligence clause and stipulation
for English law is included in the bill of lading. The forum is
England. If the statements of Greer L. J., Falconbridge, and others
are accepted, the English court will immediately say that this clause
is invalid or illegal at the place of making and therefore it is invalid
or illegal here. Is this correct procedure? Certainly not. It would
seem more correct for the court to say: What is the proper law of
this contract, for by that law the validity or legality of it is to be
determined, not by the application of some stereotyped rule. One
can, it appears, make a categorical statement in this regard that
184 (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321.
':'The Torni, (1932) P. 78, 88.
188 Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, (1920) 2 K.B. 287, 304.
187 Note, 5 Camb. L.J. 100, 101 (1933-35).
188 Case & Comment, 19 Can. B. Rev. 217, 218 (1941).
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invalidity or illegality of the contract at the place of contracting is
a completely immaterial factor for a court sitting anywhere. It is
obvious that if one desires uniformity, a choice of law rule to
determine validity of contracts should not be supplanted by rules
such as proposed by the men listed above.
It was mentioned above that in some minds the rule as to the
lex loci solutionis might be applied here as a primary factor with
lex loci contractus, so that if a contract is illegal at the place of
performance it will not be enforced anywhere. While Lord Wright,
in an earlier case, remarked that the assertion that an English court
would not enforce a contract where such was forbidden at the place
of performance was a "well-known proposition, '. the same argu-
ment can be advanced here as was in the lex loci contractus case:
if such analysis is applied, it amounts to a complete disregard, in
England, of the proper law of the contract and, in other countries,
to a similar fate for the hoped-for uniform choice of law rule. It is
therefore submitted that one has to make a stand somewhere, and
the appeal of the uniform "proper" law outweighs considerably any
maze of rules which attempt to cover single situations."'0
Where does this leave us then in the autonomy picture? Is the
restriction of legality imposed by Lord Wright truly such? If one
agrees that what is in the minds of the parties can be neither legal
nor illegal and that illegality at the place of contracting or place of
performance is immaterial, 9' then the conclusion clearly follows
that the purported condition to autonomy is not a limitation at all.
The third limitation imposed by Lord Wright in the Vita Food
case is that the intention of the parties in choosing a particular law
to govern their contract be "bona fide." Intention of the parties can
be in good or bad faith, but how can the parties be in bad faith in
choosing the law of a particular state to govern the validity of their
contract? It is submitted that there are two possibilities. One is that
the parties chose the law of X simply to evade the law which would
otherwise be applicable; and the second is that they have chosen a
law which has no connection with the contract other than by this
choice.
The first possibility, the attempted evasion of otherwise applicable
law, is similar to the French doctrine of fraude d la loi, i.e., the
189 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft,
(1937) A.C. 500 (Eng).
... See Cheshire, Private International Law 234-38 (5th ed. 1957); 2 Rabel, Conflict of
Laws 398 (1950).
191 Unless, of course, those places are also the seat of the "proper" law in which case
it is submitted that it would be more correct to apply the "proper" law than the lex loci
contractus or the lex loci solutionis,
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principle that if the facts of the case are connected with a system
of law by way of evasion, then that foreign law will not be ap-
plied. " ' The second possibility, lack of connection, is also closely
related to the French doctrine for one can readily perceive how if a
contract is connected with the chosen place, e.g., place of perform-
ance, then purposeful evasion of the lex loci contractus is more
difficult to establish. The problem seems to resolve itself into this:
can the parties select a law, which has no connection with their
contract, as the controlling and governing law; and, further, can
they do so for the avowed purpose of evading the otherwise appli-
cable law? At first glance, it would appear reasonable to say that
bad faith is in the minds of the parties if evasion is of uppermost
concern. Will this first impression continue however and, even more
important, should it continue? It is submitted that once selection of
an unconnected state is made in a contract, such as a bill of lading,
and this document contains a negligence clause, void at the place of
issue, then the forum should be wary of the selection, but not pre-
sumptuous. Investigation of the minds of the parties is certainly in
order, for a conclusion on the apparent facts without such delving
would be unfair. To illustrate: suppose a shipment from New York
to Liverpool, England in which the covering bill of lading contains
both a negligence clause and a stipulation for Argentine law. The
English forum' can take one of two positions with respect to this
stipulation: (1) it can say the Argentine law was chosen solely to
evade the provisions of Cogsa, (a fraude la loi situation) and refuse
to uphold the stipulation;'9 4 or, (2) it can say the parties chose this
law for some reason other than evasion, and uphold it.
It may be argued that the choice made by the parties was not
done with any intention in mind, i.e., that it was a purely arbitrary
selection. While Professor Gutteridge says this is automatically indic-
ative of bad faith and therefore should not be upheld,"" the present
writer tends to have more respect for the business judgment of those
who carry and those who ship goods, and it is difficult to imagine
.92 Kahn-Freund believes that in fact this restriction by Lord Wright "seems to in-
troduce into English law for the first time the French notion of fraud a la loi." Case
Note, 3 Modern L. Rev. 61, 63 (1939).
... The forum in the United States would have no problem whatsoever, as will be seen
toward the end of this section.
... It is essential to remember here that the mere fact, standing alone, of no connection
with Argentine law would not ipso facto make the English court, under Lord Wright's
formula, refuse to uphold the stipulation. You will remember he also concluded in that
case that "Connection with English law is not as a matter of principle essential" to the
validity of the stipulation. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C.
277, 290 (P.C. N.S.).
"'Gutteridge, Case Note, 55 L.Q. Rev. 323, 325 (1939): "It is difficult to conceive
of any case in which a purely arbitrary choice of law can be said to be made in good faith."
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such a business transaction being based on mere whim. Accordingly,
some intention is probably behind this selection and the two pos-
sible reasons listed above are the only ones available. It can be con-
cluded then that if the two parties at the time of contracting agreed
upon the law of a state for some purpose other than evasion, (e.g.,
for business convenience or economy) this would not be bad faith.
This, however, is as far as one can go with the nebulous topic of
intention. Accordingly, the following interpretation of "bona fide"
as a limitation on party autonomy is proposed by the writer: selection
of a law with which the contract is or is not connected is an act
done in good faith if it is done with the intention to pursue busi-
ness convenience or economy, or for any other reason which removes
the parties from pure arbitrariness. Thus, even if the parties have
chosen the law of a state which has no other connection with their
contract, and even if this law is chosen to evade the law of the place
of making or some other law, this is not necessarily mala fide; such a
selection, while incidentally being evasive, may be done primarily
for business convenience."1
The idea of a connection with the place stipulated by the parties
leads us into the next purported limitation on party autonomy, i.e.,
that which requires that the place the parties expressly intended to
govern their contract must have some substantial connection with
the contract itself. That this is not a uniformly accepted rule is
evidenced by the clear words of Lord Wright in the Vita Food case,97
setting aside the connection requirement. Nevertheless, many courts 99
and writers' have proposed this as a valid and necessary limitation,
and it can .safely be said that it is the leading impediment in the
path of complete autonomy. The question which must be answered
is this: Is the statement by Martin Wolff quoted earlier, which
absolutely requires substantial connection in order to have a valid
stipulation for governing law, to be accepted, qualified, or rejected?
The two poles of this argument are well represented by Westlake
and Cheshire who base their theories as to the proper law on a purely
objective, substantial connection footing. (Cheshire, in fact, limited
the value of express stipulations to that one instance where the facts
are such that a balance is struck between two countries-substantial
199 "Something more than the desire to escape imperative provisions will be necessary
under English law to make an intention mala fide, some morally impeachable or some
anomalous and unreasonable choice of law is probably required. Where some 'sound idea
of business convenience and common sense' . . . may be behind the choice of law English
courts will uphold the choice, even if there is no internal connexion between the contract
and the selected system." Wolff, Private International Law 419 (1950).
197 See note 194 supra.
.99 See note 220 infra.
199 See note 219 infra.
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connection therefore is equal with both-so that then, and only then,
can an express declaration of intention by the parties come in to
resolve the problem."') At the opposite pole is the view represented
by the dictum of Lord Wright in the Vita Food case when he de-
clared that connection with English law was not essential for the
validity of a stipulation for that law."' So we must accept one of
these diametrically opposed views or find some solution part way
between the two.
As many writers... and many courts2°a have quite adamantly clung
to the "substantial connection" theory while other theorists..4 and
courts"'. have been willing to exempt the requirement, might it
not be reasonable to assume that some if not all of the difficulty
lies in the definitions which these "sides" would apply to the phrase
"substantial connection"?
It is possible that what is meant by this phrase is that the stipu-
lated law must be somehow factually connected with the contract.
That is, it must be the place where the contract was entered into,
or the place of performance, the place where payment is to be made,
perhaps the country of the flag of the vessel, the nationality of the
parties, and so on. It is assumed that it is this type of connection
which the proponents of the requirement of substantial connection
have in mind. Therefore, is this the only type of connection that
is possible? It is submitted that the answer is negative, and that a
solution to this problem can be had, which should prove satisfactory
to both "sides," and, of even more importance, very possibly to
those most interested and involved, the contracting parties.
It was stated earlier"'. that, while Professor Gutteridge was of the
opinion that a completely arbitrary choice by the parties was open
.' Cheshire, Private International Law 256 (2d ed. 1938). This is the second edition
of this fine work; no such inclination on the part of the learned writer was found in the
present-fifth--edition; this may be set down as a direct result of the decision in the
Vita Food case. It should be noted, however, that in the fifth edition, Professor Cheshire
does admit that in the arbitration agreements, connection is not essential (p. 215) and
that express stipulation can be helpful in matters of interpretation (p. 238).
201 See note 194 supra.
202 Cook, supra note 181, at 429; Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Ill.
L. Rev. 899, 916 (1938); Falconbridge, Bills of Lading: Proper Law and Renvoi, 18 Can.
B. Rev. 77, 94 (1940); Falconbridge, supra note 169; Parker, Free Will in Conflict of
Laws, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 454, 458-59 (1932), are exemplary of this school.
23 Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929); Owens v. Hagen-
beck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Atl. 158 (1937); In re Claim by Herbert
Wagg & Co. Ltd., (1956) Ch. 323; Boissevain v. Weil, (1949) 1 K.B. 482.
.4 Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553,
576 (1957); Note, Intention of the Parties-The Requirement of Substantial Connection,
10 La. L. Rev. 346, 356 (1950).
2s Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277 (P.C.N.S.);
Duskin v. Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727, 730 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 829 (1948), noted, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157 (1948).
"o See pp, .$6-17 supra.
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to a charge of bad faith, it nevertheless would be difficult to con-
ceive of an instance in which absolute arbitrariness was present,
taking into account the important fact that business acumen would
probably prevent such from happening. Accordingly, when selec-
tion of applicable law is made expressly by the parties before any
problems do arise, it is fair to conclude that they did so with some
intent or purpose in mind. For example, it is a "common feature of
international commerce""2 7 for the parties to agree to submission to
arbitration in a country which is completely foreign to the parties
and their contract. Such agreements have never been seriously
questioned as to validity,0 8 even where there is no other connection
with the designated place. Here at the very least there is an analogous
situation to that at hand. If two parties in Manitoba agree to ship
and carry grain from the lakehead to Italy through the seaway and
in the bill of lading stipulate for arbitration of all disputes arising
thereunder in London (a common practice) then the mere fact of
lack of other connection with England will be ruled immaterial. It
therefore becomes difficult to see why, if the same parties under
similar circumstances stipulate for the application of English law
to any problems arising, it should now be a prerequisite to have
some other, factual connection with England. Further, even if the
analogy between the arbitration situation and that of the agreement
for governing law can be avoided-which, to the writer, would be
a rather difficult task-the fact remains that if the parties in good
faith. 9 desire their contract to be controlled and governed by English
law for a matter of business convenience, a connection has been
established. This is, in short, the submission of the writer; when two
rational businessmen expressly select a law which is to at least one
of them "connected" with the contract (perhaps the trade associa-
tion-as in corn or cotton-does almost its entire business there) no
caprice or arbitrariness is shown. This, to the writer, is "substantial
connection." There are many possibilities for selection of an other-
wise unconnected law, e.g., the head office of one of the parties is
there, or the courts of that jurisdiction are more experienced in
matters connected with this type of business and can therefore
expedite claims in a more or less predictable fashion. The reasons
are myriad and one can readily see that this compromise between
absolutely free autonomy and that which requires factual, objective
connection is tailored to business convenience without sacrifice of
.. Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 190, at 215.
20. See cases cited, ibid. See also 2 Rabel, op. cit. supra note 190.
... This has been discussed supra p. 257.
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legal principles. When there is added to this the reminder as stated
earlier, that the parties be bona fide, then this criterion of business
convenience which fills the substantial connection requirement is
submitted as the sensible approach to party autonomy by express
stipulation.
This is admittedly the crucial question in the express stipulation
category and one should summarize this last proposition thus: At
any time that the parties stipulate for some particular law to govern
their agreement, this stipulation must have some connection with
their transaction either factually, as the place of making, or because
it is for a place which is to them as business people convenient, viewed
from the standpoint of business practice. That seemingly rare in-
stance wherein an apparently arbitrary choice is made can then be
handled on a lack of good faith basis.
To summarize the express stipulation situation then we can con-
clude the following: within the prescribed limits, 1' a stipulation by
the parties for governing law as a matter of business convenience
should be upheld if not contrary to the public policy of the forum.
B. The Scope Of Autonomy Where The Intention Is Not Expressed
Where there is a fact situation involving a choice of law rule and
no expressed intention for some law has been made by the parties,
it would appear that the court has open to it four possible avenues.
1. The Formal, Stereotyped Rules
These we have already dealt with in the preceding discussion and
have disposed of each as being of no value in a search for uniformity
of application of a choice of law rule.
2. The Presumed Intent From Formal Rules
A number of years ago, an English court, in a shipping case, 11 held
that "the law of the place where the contract is made is prima facie
that which the parties intended. . . ." A large number of cases on
both sides of the Atlantic have been decided on similar grounds."'
Similarly, a number of cases have held the law of the place of per-
formance to govern as that is the presumed intent of the parties,"
220 That is, outside the area of capacity, form, and procedural matters, outside the statu-
tory controlled preempted area, in matters of essential validity.
' Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Nav. Co., (1882) 9
Q.B.D. 118, 122.
.2 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 459
(1889); Potter v. The Majestic, 60 Fed. 624 (2d Cir. 1894); British South Africa Co.
v. DeBeers Consol. Mines, (1910) 1 Ch. 354; Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nay. Co. v.
Shand, 3 Moore N.S, 272, 16 Eng. Rep. 103 (P.C. 1865); Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais,
(1884) 12 Q.B.D. 589. See also Wharton, Conflict of Laws 1059-63 (1905); Parker,
supra note 202, at 454.
.. Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116, 120 (1891); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124
(1882); Jacob v. Credit Lyonnais, supra note 212.
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and for the same reason, the law of the flag214 and the law of the
place which holds the agreement valid."'
While these may be labelled as "intent" or "autonomy" cases be-
cause the word "intent" is used descriptively, it is submitted that
these cases and the category they represent are simply a division of
the preceding group for the courts are deciding the cases by applica-
tion of the formal, stereotyped rules of lex loci contractus and others
and then dressing the decisions up in the clothes of intent. After all,
if a court states that it is applying the law of the place where the
contract was made or where it is to be performed because that is
presumably what the parties intended, while we may now say that
this is autonomy it most assuredly is an approach that leaves much
to be desired. It is thought that much more clarity could be injected
if a court was simply to say in the first instance that the law intended
by the parties is the law of X and not so secondarily following a
presumption; resort to the formal rules is superfluous and can only
lead to confusion.1"
3. The Implied Intent of the Parties
A number of cases have held that, in the absence of expressed
intent, the correct law to govern the validity of a contract is that
which is intended by the parties, and in so doing have chosen the
law of a place which was in the minds of the parties but was simply
not expressed by them. How is such a finding possible? What criteria
do the courts look for to indicate intention? The answer appears
to be fairly uniform. Gathering the pertinent facts, the court ascer-
tains the place with which the contract has the closest connection-
the place of the most number of points of contact-and then pro-
ceeds to settle upon the law of that place as the law which will govern
the validity of the contract in question. One must be careful not to
conclude, however, that such a choice is made in every case for the
same reason. There are really two fundamental reasons which courts
have advanced and they establish the necessity of this and the next
category at which we will look. To explain further: once the court
214 In re Missouri S.S. Co., (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321, 328.
... Pritchard v. Norton, 142 U.S. 116 (1891); see cases cited in 40 Colum. L. Rev.
521 n.23 (1940).216 "It is doubtful . . . whether any useful purpose is served by the traditional practice
of regarding certain facts, such as the locus contractus, the locus solutionis or, in the
case of a contract of affreightment, the nationality of the flag, as presumptive evidence
of the governing law. To enter upon the search with a presumption is only too often to
set out upon a false trail. It may tend to divert attention from the necessity to consider
every single pointer." Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 190, at 211. And, in The Assunzione,
(1954) 2 Weekly L.R. 234, the shipper invoked the presumption of the lex loci contractus
and the carrier the law of the flag; both were dismissed by the court in favor of the
points of contact of the contract.
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has gathered in the facts which it considers important it then selects
the jurisdiction considered to be most closely connected with the con-
tract. This jurisdiction has the greatest number of points of contact
and therefore is selected as the governing law. It is what they do
next that is important, theoretically, at least, for it is here that
authority is split. One group maintains that once the law has been
selected, the court must then declare that, as this is the seat of the
contract, it is the place that the parties must have intended to govern
their transaction. For sake of convenience, we can label this a sub-
jective approach. The alternate group maintains, once the selection
of the law is made, that this is the law that a reasonable man would
have intended; accordingly, this is the law the parties concerned
ought to have intended. This is termed an objective approach and
will be discussed in the following section.
While there is a problem in the express intent area of substantial
connection, obviously no such problem exists in the implied inten-
tion situation where the basis is placed on points of contact. Aside
from one instance then, there would appear to be no real obstacle
in the path of this subjective approach. That exception is in the
instance where one could say that the parties tacitly intended a
particular law to apply. This could arise where the parties have dealt
in this business before and have always had problems settled by
application of a particular body of law; or perhaps the parties have
not had dealings with each other before but the particular trade they
are now engaged in makes a practice of subjecting differences to a
particular jurisdiction or law. In these two instances one might say
that although the majority of the points of contact is with place X,
it is the practice or custom of the parties to submit to the law of
place Y. If this is accepted, then one might conceivably say that
here the parties have tacitly implied that it is their intention to sub-
mit to the law of Y. If the objection is again advanced that there is
no other factual connection with Y, then one could argue along the
same lines as was done in the express intent section, i.e., that "business
convenience" is a sufficient connection.
If one advocates an intention theory for choice of law in the
absence of an expressed intention, he could say that a court is to
survey the facts, choose the law with which the transaction is most
closely connected, and conclude that that is the law the parties must
have had in mind for solution of any possible differences. This would
seem to properly follow from an acceptance of the theory used in
the express intention cases and as there it was concluded that it is
within the powers of the parties to select the applicable law, uni-
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formity requires a similar line of thought in cases where no express
selection has been made. Again, if it is conceded in the express cases-
as it seems it must be-that it is within the province of the parties
to select law, then the same must follow in this category.
One can then place all of the cases in one fairly neat package with
three compartments: (1) Express intent; (2) Tacit intent; and (3)
Implied intent.
All three necessarily involve the public policy of the forum, but
once this is set aside, the only requirement is connection with the
intended law through some business convenience factor.
4. The Presumed Intent of the Parties Arising From Points of Contact
As was mentioned in the preceding section, it is possible, once the
points of contact have been assessed, to conclude that the law which
"stands out" is that law which a reasonable man would have selected
(and therefore which these parties should have selected).
This objective approach does not pretend to delve into the minds
of the parties concerned, but remains aloof and apart. It is obvious
that the conclusion as to applicable law will be exactly the same as
in the subjective approach, so one may immediately ask: where is the
problem? To be sure the problem is purely academic and theoretical
for it is true that a "subjective" court and an "objective" court will
arrive at the same conclusion and the same result in the case, but for
different reasons. Should we continue to distinguish the two, or
should we just forget the distinction as it does not make any real
difference anyway?
Let us look at a recent decision217 in an admiralty matter to see
what happens. A charterparty in the English language was negotiated
in France between a Frenchman and an Italian. The major portion
of the freight for a shipment from France to Italy on an Italian
vessel was to be paid in Italian currency in Italy. From these facts,
the Court of Appeal in England was able to conclude that just and
reasonable men would have intended Italian law to apply and there-
fore that this was the "probable intention of the parties. 21. When
confronted with the proposition that the intent of the parties should
be pursued subjectively, asking -what they "would" have intended
rather than what they "ought" to have intended, Birkett, L. J. re-
marked that there was an aura of "unreality" 1 ' about a subjective
approach as one party would certainly intend French law and the
other, Italian. To him, the objective, reasonable man criterion was
217 The Assunzione, supra note 216.
"'The Assunzione, (1954) 2 Weekly L.R. 234.
219 Ibid.
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alone acceptable. Professor Kahn-Freund, in writing on this case,
observed that as the "proper law" was found by looking at the con-
necting factors, it made little difference whether the court did so by
pretending the actual parties intended this, or that reasonable parties
would have intended it. His conclusion was therefore that the "battle
between the 'objectivists' and the 'subjectivists' [is] a fight in the
clouds., 22 ' Professor Kahn-Freund then would dismiss the theoretical
difference as it is unimportant to the decision of a case in any event.22
It is agreed that there is no difference in result and the present
writer agrees as well that perhaps it would be good if the theoretical
opposites-subjective and objective-were dismissed as irrelevant.
This is the most acceptable base and logically follows from an ap-
plication of a "localization 2 2 1 theory. If courts would decide a choice
of law problem where there is no expression of intent on a purely
objective basis-as is the starting point and the foundation for either
the so-called "subjective" or "objective" approaches-no problems of
a theoretical nature would arise. It is only when an explanation is
attempted of why this was done that difficulties arise. As the practice
is so prevalent for courts to rest their decision on either the intent
of the parties involved or on the presumed intent of the reasonable
man, it becomes necessary, however, to depart from simplicity and
adhere to practice. Accordingly, as it appears that the "would" and
the "ought" are here to stay, some discussion should follow on which
is preferable.
One major reason is advanced why the implied intent-the
"would" category-is a better choice. While some may doubtless
find reasons just as convincing for upholding the reasonable man
thesis, the choice of the former is made by the writer to maintain
continuity and in an attempt to return maritime law to some
semblance of uniformity. Hence, it is thought that as party auto-
nomy is advanced as the best available solution to choice of law
problems, this idea should pervade the entire field of maritime con-
tracts and not be restricted to mere expressed intent. If this is
accepted, then where no expression is extant, the court may find
the correct law by an objective process and explain their find in a
more uniform fashion by declaring that this is the law these parties
intended; they simply failed to express that intent.
220 Case Note, 17 Modern L. Rev. 255 (1954).
21 Id. at 259.
222 See also Wolff, op. cit. supra note 196, at 131-32.
221 Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 190.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Will an adoption of autonomy solve the many problems which
still remain in the bill of lading-maritime law field? The reply must
be in the affirmative when two things are taken into consideration.
The first is the assumption that the nations of the world will use
the autonomy theory in deciding upon a choice of law rule. While
some restrictions exist,"4 it is a theory which "is followed 'with
astonishing unanimity' by courts of leading European and Latin-
American countries." ' It may safely be forecast that the "selling
job" has largely been accomplished and the market is receptive.2
Some difficulties do indeed remain, for until it is demonstrated by
acceptance over a lengthy period of time in near-universal fashion,
some courts will tend to use other methods to seek uniformity." '
It is not difficult to see, however, that the autonomy answer is the
only one which has sufficient potential to engender uniformity and
accordingly must be pursued. '
The second thought which must be considered arises from a case
to which we had occasion to refer earlier in this work, Win. H. Muller
& Co. v. Swedish-Am. Line, Ltd."9 There, a court in the United States
gave effect to an express stipulation for the application of Swedish
law in Sweden in a bill of lading which covered a shipment from
Sweden to the United States. While this, it is true, is in complete align-
ment with the thesis of autonomy supported by the writer, it is sub-
mitted that the decision is not only erroneous, but can lead to
dangerous results.2 0 Let us take an example to illustrate. Suppose a
224 See 2 Rabel, op. cit. supra note 190, at 368-76.
225 Cook, supra note 202, at 900.
22s See Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 341, 350-52 (1952).
227 See, for example, the case of The Alhena remarked upon in an article by J.
Offerhaus, Netherlands Maritime Law and the Conflict of Laws, Arkiv for Sjorett 20
(1952).
22 Perhaps passing mention should be made to the somewhat unfortunate manner in
which Lord Wright handled the decision in the Vita Food case. He made one statement
which can only be classed as a lapsus calami on his part when he remarked that there
was no reason "for refusing to give effect to the express selection of English law as the
proper law in the bill of lading. Hence, English rules relating to the conflict of laws
must be applied to determine how the bills of lading are affected by the failure to com-
ply with s. 3 of the Act." (1939) A.C. 277, 292 (P.C. N.S.) Dean Falconbridge correctly,
it is submitted, concluded that this was somewhat strange, that English conflict rules would
apply, following the selection of English law by the proper law theory. The present
writer agrees entirely with Dean Falconbridge that this can lead very easily to a renvoi
situation and that surely the Privy Council did not intend such a result. See Falcon-
bridge, Bills of Lading: Proper Law and Renvoi, 18 Can. B. Rev. 77, 84-86 (1940). That
a reference to English law is to English internal or municipal law only, is suggested as
being the only possible interpretation that one should place on a stipulation for that law.
On this point see also Morris and Cheshire, The Proper Law of a Contract in the Con-
flict of Laws, 56 L.Q. Rev. 320, 333-35 (1940).
229 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
... See Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 125 n.23 (1957).
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shipment of goods from New York to England with the covering bill
of lading containing a negligence clause and a stipulation for Argen-
tine law. Following negligent damage to the goods, the shipper sues the
carrier in a New York court. If the autonomy theory is carried to its
extent, then the court in New York is to apply the law of Argentina.
Essentially this is what one must conclude from the decision in the
Muller case. The same would hold true in the case of an incoming
shipment to the United States from any other country with the bill
stipulating for the law of any country other than the United States.
It is in these types of cases that the autonomy theory can not be
applied. If it is, there is a direct violation of the provisions of Cogsa.
According to this statute, "Every bill of lading or similar document
of title which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by
sea to or from ports of the United States, in foreign trade, shall have
effect subject to the provisions of this chapter."23' From this, it can
only be concluded that in a United States forum, when any of the
possible conflict problems arise involving a possible choice of law, the
provisions of Cogsa will step in and no choice of law problem then ex-
ists. To allow such a stipulation in a shipment to or from the United
States, in a United States forum, is erroneous. Of course, the same
holds true of ,any country which has similar legislation or has ratified
the Brussels Convention. In other words, the autonomy doctrine is
confined to its only possible position, that is, to cover cases where
uniformity has not been made possible by multilateral agreements.
To'forestall any misapplication however, the following caveat must
be noticed with great care: because in a situation like that in the Muller
case the United States forum should disregard the stipulation for gov-
erning law, it should not be supposed that the parties must now or
should now omit from their bills of lading, stipulations for applicable
law. This would be a grave error and would result in more complicated
problems. Even though the stipulation should have no weight in a
court in the United States,.3 there is absolutely no assurance to either
party that that is where the eventual forum will be. Accordingly,
the plan is this: in every shipment of goods covered by a bill of lading,
the parties should stipulate for some law to govern any possible dispute
that may subsequently arise. If the forum turns out to be in a place
where the provisions of Cogsa and similar legislation apply to that
shipment (in the United States to inward and outward shipments; in
England, for example, to outward shipments only) then the stipula-
23149 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300 (1958).
"'. See Sociedade Brasileira Dc Intercambio Comercial E Industrial, Ltda. v. The S.S.
Punta Del Este, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 2288.
[Vol. 1 5
CONFLICT OF LAW
tion is of no effect. If, however, the forum is in a third country, then
if that country accepts the theory of autonomy, the chosen law will
be applied with some measure of predictability. If the stipulation is
not included, then predictability is gone and the validity of the negli-
gence or any other clause in a bill of lading will be in doubt until
such time as a forum is chosen. The stipulation for governing law is
a safety-valve which allows the parties a greater measure of knowledge
of the validity of their contractual provisions. If they stipulate for
some law they are at least on much firmer ground than if the choice
is left completely in the hands of some unknown forum. To the
writer this is the only practical answer to near-uniformity in the ab-
sence of a complete covering of the field by convention adopted by
all countries concerned.
Finally, we come to the place where we can make the following
statement: If the parties to a bill of lading stipulate for applicable
law, this should be allowed to stand in any forum: (1) If not within
the ambit of convention or legislation; (2) If not contrary to the
public policy of the forum; and (3) If done for business convenience.
If the parties do not expressly select a law to govern their contract,
then the court should survey the points of contact, "localize" it, and
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Footnotes to Appendix
* In the chart, it is suggested that a negligence clause has been inserted by a carrier in
a bill of lading covering the shipments.
a The United States is exemplary of those countries which have legislation dealing with
shipments both inward and outward. The other two are the Philippines and Belgium.
France, in this instance, is typical of the thirty-three States which have ratified the Brus-
sels Convention.
249 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. 5 1300 (1958).
'France, like the United States, has both ratified the Brussels Convention (1936) and
passed enacting legislation (Act of April 2, 1936). It is probable that the Convention ap-
plies to all shipments issued in any of the contracting States (except perhaps in France
itself, i.e., between French ports). The legislation, on the other hand, is not nearly as clear
in its area of applicability. Yiannopoulos believes, and he is apparently well supported by
French jurisprudence, that the Act of April 2, 1936, applies to incoming shipments from
nonsignatory (to the Brussels Convention) States. Yiannopoulos, Bills of Lading and the
Conflict of Laws: Validity of "Negligence" Clauses in France, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 516,
530 (1958).
'If, in this case, the forum was in Argentina, a country which has not adopted the
Brussels Convention nor has it any similar domestic legislation, a nice question of choice
of law is presented. Presumably, a choice could be made of place of contracting, place of
performance, law of the flag, law of the forum, law of the place of injury, law chosen by
the parties, proper law of the contract, and perhaps others. Public policy is of some mo-
ment in various countries as well. Hence, it is impossible to forecast the validity of the
negligence clause unless first the forum is set and then the jurisprudence and doctrine of
that jurisdiction is such as to render a prognosis effective. For an example see note 17 infra.
' England is chosen as an example of a country which has ratified the Brussels Con-
vention and has domestic legislation which applies only to shipments leaving England.
'As English legislation applies only to outward shipments, an inbound one is not sub-
jected to it. Hence, the interpretation of a bill of lading is subject, as to the validity of its
clauses, to the conflicts rules of England. Scrutton takes the view that in such a case,
bills of lading "will be governed by the law by which the parties intend to be bound, .... "
Scrutton, Charterparties 21, 455 (1955). That is, the negligence clause will be inter-
preted as any other in the bill and if valid according to the applicable law, it will be upheld.
If the forum is in Canada, for example, then if the Canadian court decides that the
applicable law is the place of contracting (United States) the clause will be held invalid.
If, however, they decide on one of another group of available choices, then it is possible for
them to uphold the validity of the clause.
'The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22, § 1.
It is much more probable here that the clause will be held invalid as both the lex
loci contractus and the lex loci destinationis, if either is selected as the governing law, would
deny validity to the clause.
" Canada is selected because it has domestic legislation along the Brussels Convention
lines, but has never ratified the Convention. This has peculiar significance in respect to
France, as was explained earlier.
"a Water Carriage of Goods Act, Can. Rev. Star. c. 291 (1952). Section 2 states that
the rules "shall have effect in relation to and in connection with the carriage of goods by
water in ships carrying goods from any port in Canada to any other port whether in or
outside Canada."
" Great doubt exists here as to the validity of a negligence clause in such a case. Knauth
suggests that "French . . . courts will . . . deal with Canadian bills of lading according
to their apparent tenor, even though the parties, in issuing the bill of lading, violated the
law and policy of the country of issue." Knauth, Ocean Bills of Lading, 160 (1953).
Yiannopoulos, on the other hand, suggests that the public policy of France is such as to
deny validity to such a clause. He cites a French case of the Court of Cassation which ap-
parently is in conjunction with this feeling. Yiannopoulos, op. cit. supra note 3, at 529-30.
" It is submitted that even if the forum was in a country, the United States, for ex-
ample, or any other that has Cogsa-like legislation, it has no application to this case as
it is a shipment between foreign ports. See Knauth, op. cit. supra note 12, at 155.
'4See note 11 supra.
" See note 13 supra.
a" Argentina represents those countries which have neither ratified the Brussels Con-
vention nor enacted domestic legislation pursuant thereto.
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7 A quotation from a comparative study of the Bustamante Code, the Montevideo Con-
vention, and the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws made by the Inter-American Judicial
Committee in 1954 is applicable here as it relates to the Argentine position on choice of
law. Article 25 of the 1940 Treaty on Navigation contained the following: "Contracts of
charter-party, and of transport of merchandise or persons, concerned with effecting such
transportation between ports of one and the same State, are governed by the laws of that
State, regardless of nationality of the vessel involved .... ." Article 26 had this to say:
"When the contracts above-mentioned are to be executed in one of the States, they are
governed by the law in force in that State, regardless of the place where they were con-
cluded or the nationality of the vessel .... " At the Hague Conference of 1928, Argentina
made the following reservation, which is the quotation referred to above.
"It makes specific reservation of the application of the law of the flag to
questions relating to maritime law, especially as regards the charter party and
its legal effect, as it considers that these should be subject to the law and
jurisdiction of the country of the port of destination.
"This principle was successfully upheld by the Argentine branch of the
International Law Association, at its 31st Session and is now one of the Buenos
Aires Rules."
" Even if this forum was in a country having legislation similar to the United States
Cogsa, it would not apply as it is a shipment between foreign ports. A forum in a non-
uniform country is completely free as well to make its own choice as to applicable law.
" See note 17 supra.
20 See note 18 supra.
21 See note 3 supra.
2a As indicated in note 17 supra, the clause will probably be valid according to an
Argentine court.
23 See note 18 supra.
24 See note 17 supra. As the law of the destination is favored in Argentina, and as
French courts are evidently willing to use the Law of April 2, 1936, to disallow the negli-
gence clause in incoming shipments basing their decisions on public policy, Argentina may
be willing to give effect to this French jurisprudence. This is pure conjecture, however.
2' This, at least, is the opinion of Yiannopoulos. See note 12 supra and note the follow-
ing quotation from this writer: "the law of April 2, 1936 applies proprio vigore as forum
law not only to bills of lading issued in France and not covered by the Brussels Conven-
tion, but also to bills of lading issued in countries not adhering to the Brussels Con-
vention for the carriage of goods to French ports." Yiannopoulos, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 530.
26 See note 1 8 supra.
" These countries are selected as examples of nations which have no connection with
the Brussels Convention, either by ratification or by adoption of domestic legislation.
as See note 17 supra.
2o See note 4 supra.
3s See note 18 supra.
